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Abstract 
Technical communication certificates are offered by many colleges 
and universities as an alternative to a full undergraduate or graduate degree 
in the field. Despite certificates’ increasing popularity in recent years, 
however, surprisingly little commentary exists about them within the 
scholarly literature. In this work, I describe a survey of certificate and 
baccalaureate programs that I performed in 2008 in order to develop basic, 
descriptive data on programs’ age, size, and graduation rates; departmental 
location; curricular requirements; online offerings; and instructor status 
and qualifications. In performing this research, I apply recent insights 
from neosophistic rhetorical theory and feminist critiques of science to 
both articulate, and model, a feminist-sophistic methodology. I also 
suggest in this work that technical communication certificates can be 
theorized as a particularly sophistic credential for a particularly sophistic 
field, and I discuss the implications of neosophistic theory for certificate 
program design and administration. 
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Dangerous as it may be to do so, I hereby 
admit that everything after this sentence is 
sophistry. 
—Jasper Neel, 
Plato, Derrida, and Writing 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Introduction 
Technical communication certificates are offered by many colleges 
and universities as an alternative to a full undergraduate or graduate degree 
in the field. Certificates typically require only one or two years of 
coursework strictly within technical communication, and can typically be 
earned while working full time or while seeking another degree. 
According to the Council for Programs in Technical and Scientific 
Communication (CPTSC) and the Society for Technical Communication 
(STC) joint publication Academic Programs in Technical Communication 
(third edition), there were 16 programs offering technical writing 
certificates in 1985 (qtd. in Shirk et al. 1). In 2008, I was able to identify 
at least 89 individual certificate programs, representing a roughly sixfold 
increase in number over 23 years. Compared to an approximate tripling of 
the number of technical communication programs overall during the same 
period, it’s clear that certificate programs are an increasingly popular 
means of meeting the demand for skilled technical communicators. 
Despite this popularity, however, surprisingly little information or 
discussion exists in the scholarly literature specifically about certificates. 
This informational and conversational void is unusual, as certificate 
programs are potentially located in the middle of several important 
conversations in the field of technical communication. With their 
apparent vocational emphasis, certificate programs are potentially a site of 
conflict “on the issue of training opposed to education, or in other words, 
the conflict between theory and practice” (Little, “Designing” 278). With 
their role in meeting the needs of local industry, and with their potential 
to serve as the locations for academy-industry cooperation, certificate 
programs speak to the conversation of who shapes technical 
communication programs: academy or industry (Anderson; Bosley, 
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“Collaborative Partnerships”; Bushnell; Coon and Scanlon; Krestas, 
Fisher, and Hakos; Yee; Zimmerman). With certificate programs’ role as a 
gatekeeper to the profession—that is, the role of “certifying” implicit in 
their very name—they also raise questions about what counts as an 
appropriate academic preparation for practicing technical communicators 
(Shirk 4) and they present a number of significant implications to the 
project of professionalizing the field (Savage, “Process” 364–65). 
In this dissertation, I describe my efforts to address the 
informational void surrounding technical communication certificate 
programs by performing a survey of program administrators. By 
developing basic, descriptive data on programs’ age, size, and graduation 
rates; departmental location; curricular requirements; online offerings; and 
instructor status and qualifications, I hope to make way for more situated 
and productive dialog in the above scholarly conversations. I also hope to 
provide information, considerations, theoretical reflections, and cautions 
that are useful for administrators interested in implementing their own 
certificate programs. As I conduct the present survey with these research 
aims in mind, however, I also engage self-reflexively with a number of 
issues concerning epistemology and methodology. Applying recent 
insights from neosophistic rhetorical theory and feminist critiques of 
science, I seek within this study to articulate and model revised practices 
for empirical research. As I suggest, by employing a distinctly feminist-
sophistic methodology, this study can respond to contemporary 
conversations in the field of technical communication more ethically and 
rigorously than by using traditional scientific and academic methods alone. 
About Certificates 
In 1988, the CPTSC workshop group on certificates advanced the 
following definition of a certificate program: 
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A certificate is a college or university awarded credential 
granted for successful completion of a defined program of 
study. Certificates can be awarded at the undergraduate or 
the graduate level. 
A Technical Communication Certificate differs from a 
Masters Degree in two significant ways. First, a Masters 
program will require more credit hours and, therefore, a 
longer period of study. A Masters program will also 
promote more research into the study of the theory of 
technical communication. The limited scope of the 
Certificate in Technical Communication distinguishes it 
from the undergraduate degree in this area. (28) 
The workshop group went on to issue the following call for basic research 
describing certificates: 
We recommend a nationwide survey to gather information 
on the content of existing Certificate programs. In addition, 
we recommend that [the] CPTSC survey the number of full-
time to part-time to adjunct faculty teaching in Certificate 
Programs in Technical Communication to establish a 
standard for an appropriate ratio. (28) 
Despite this call, however, the scholarly literature specifically on technical 
communication certificate programs is confined to only a pair of book 
chapters (Little, “Designing”; Nugent, “Looking”) and a dozen or so 
CPTSC presentations (Bosley, “Building”; Bridgeford, “Academic”; 
Bridgeford, “Negotiated”; Bridgeford, “Repurposing”; Bridgeford, 
“Thoughts”; Little, “Problem”; Little, “Proof”; Nugent, 2006; Pfeiffer; 
Rehling; Shirk; Shirk et al.; Worley). Even though they span over 20 years 
of scholarship, these works comprise (by my count) fewer than 70 pages of 
text. 
Among the most in-depth treatments of certificate programs is 
Sherry Burgus Little’s 1997 chapter, “Designing Certificate Programs in 
Technical Communication.” In this work Little provides a general review 
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and synthesis of information on certificate programs found in the four 
editions of Academic Programs in Technical Communication published 
between 1976 and 1993. As she notes, certificate programs are diverse in 
their charter and construction. Some programs are geared toward those 
entering the field, while others are designed to augment the skills of 
practicing professionals. Some programs are designed to serve those in 
scientific and technical fields specifically, while others are designed to 
serve technical communicators more generally. Certificates are offered at 
both the undergraduate and graduate levels, and the courses they require 
vary widely (276–77). Little further characterizes certificates as flexible 
and localized: 
They can be modified easily and quickly, adapting to 
changing demands, because they are generally monitored 
and scrutinized less closely than other kinds of programs. 
Because of their flexibility—their content is rarely 
mandated by degree requirements of educational 
legislation—they can be individuated for students, adapting 
to diverse backgrounds and goals. (275) 
Little also suggests that certificate programs are comparatively easy to 
implement (see also Shirk 2). As she describes, the bureaucratic 
machinations required to establish a new degree program can be 
considerable: 
In most institutions, proposing a degree involves a 
staggering amount of paperwork and numerous procedures. 
A chain of approvals needs to be won from committees and 
administrators at all levels and frequently beyond the local 
institution itself to centralized administrations, boards of 
trustees, state-level educational approving agencies, and 
even state legislators. Such approval processes are time-
consuming, sometimes taking years before a degree comes 
into existence. (275) 
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In contrast, certificate programs are much easier to initiate, as oversight for 
their creation rarely extends beyond the immediate institution and they 
can usually take advantage of courses and resources already in place across 
the university (275). For these reasons, certificates can be an attractive 
option for emerging programs (see Bridgeford, “Repurposing” 79; Pfeiffer 
6; Shirk 1; Worley 110). 
In my 2003 study of certificate programs, “Certificate Programs in 
Technical Communication: Looking Closer, through Sophistic Eyes,” I 
attempt to offer a more systematic response to the CPTSC workshop 
group’s call for research into the content and staffing of certificate 
programs. In the first part of that study, I closely examine 62 certificate 
programs in technical communication in order to characterize them in 
terms of their curricular requirements. In the second part of that study, I 
perform a survey of certificate program administrators to gauge who 
teaches in such programs, the age of such programs, and the relationship 
of such programs to local industry. I conclude that certificate program 
curricula “are so wildly disparate that no core curriculum can be said to 
exist among them.” I also find that certificate programs demonstrate a 
concern with the needs of local industry, with most programs recruiting 
from local industry, making use of industry advisory boards, or employing 
some other means to gather feedback from local industry. However, in 
that study I present only limited data about the degrees required of 
certificate program instructors, leaving many questions about their status 
unanswered. 
Although the scholarship on certificate programs is scant, much of 
the available commentary expresses a certain wariness about them. For 
instance, the CPTSC workshop group’s 1988 call for research implies their 
suspicion that certificates are perhaps less ably staffed or of inferior in 
quality compared other technical communication programs. Little suggests 
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that the certificate’s relative lack of oversight, its lack of standardization, its 
localization, and its curricular diversity could possibly lead to its lack of 
acceptance as a valid credential (“Designing” 276; see also Little, 
“Problem”). Tracy Bridgeford voices her concern that the label “‘certificate’ 
could reinforce the ‘vocational ethos’ often attached to our programs and 
courses” (“Repurposing” 79). In a 1988 presentation to the CPTSC, 
Henrietta Nickels Shirk offers a litany of questions that reflect a general 
suspicion toward certificates: 
Who should teach in these programs? Should our 
instructors have primarily academic backgrounds, should 
they be current practitioners in the field, or should the 
“ideal” program have a group of instructors who represent 
some combination of these different sets of skills? If there 
are industry advisory boards for our programs, do they 
recommend course content rather than dictate it? And is 
this course content balanced with the application of sound 
theory and effective teaching strategies? Are our certificate 
programs too focused in their content and therefore on the 
edge of being parochial? While graduates may meet the 
immediate job needs of local industries, will they also be 
equally successful […] in other parts of the country? (2–3) 
In her own 1998 presentation to the CPTSC, meanwhile, Lu Rehling urges 
the council to “contribute to the evolution of certificate programs in our 
field by helping to set some standards and publicize some parameters” 
(51).  
And in their 2007 article “‘Remapping Curricular Geography’: A 
Retrospection,” James Porter and Patricia Sullivan implicate certificate 
programs, at least tangentially, in the marginalization of professional 
writing. They note that professional writing remains the subject of 
“indignity and neglect” (16) at many institutions: an indignity  
amplified by the number of English departments that start 
a professional writing certificate by adding an internship to 
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a literature major and by insisting that their hire (notice the 
singular) in professional writing have status in literature (or 
at least have signed a loyalty oath to the love of it). In other 
words, English departments often undermine the 
disciplinarity of professional writing by hiring literary folks 
to teach it. Unfortunately, this form of colonization 
continues at many institutions. (16) 
It is clear from these accounts that certificates not only provoke anxiety 
about issues of program quality, but that these issues almost immediately 
and invariably spill over into a range of important field-wide concerns and 
conversations. I take it to be indicative of the centrality and significance of 
certificate programs that the limited scholarly commentary about them 
touches on such broad issues as: 
• the material and professional status of technical 
communication instructors,  
• debates concerning the project of establishing technical 
communication as a profession and scholarly discipline (i.e., the 
professionalization debates),  
• debates over the establishment of nationwide certification for 
technical communication practitioners or instructors, 
• debates over vocationalism and academy-industry 
collaboration,  
• concerns over the relationship between theory and practice in 
technical communication, and 
• debates over the political and material consequences of 
technical communication’s common disciplinary location 
within departments of English.  
Although I can’t hope to satisfactorily address all of the issues and 
anxieties presented by certificate programs in the present research, I do 
believe that the basic descriptive data, methodological considerations, and 
theoretical reflections that I seek to articulate here can be used to support 
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more situated and productive conversation about these increasingly 
popular programs. 
About the Present Study 
Proposing to more fully respond to the CPTSC’s 1988 call for basic 
descriptive data regarding certificate program instructors, in 2006 I sought 
and won support from the council to perform a mailed survey of certificate 
and baccalaureate program administrators. With this research, I attempt to 
augment our basic understanding of certificates by answering the 
following questions: 
• What is typical of technical communication certificate 
programs in terms of their: 
o type of department or academic unit, 
o age, 
o size, 
o graduation rates, 
o course requirements,  
o length to program completion, 
o online offerings, and 
o internship requirements? 
• To provide a baseline for analysis, what is typical for 
baccalaureate programs in terms of the same attributes above?  
• What are the professional qualifications of certificate program 
instructors, and how do they compare to the qualifications of 
baccalaureate program instructors? These qualifications 
include: 
o level of academic preparation, 
o academic specialization, 
o possession of industry or professional experience, 
o status as a graduate student, and 
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o status as a tenure-track instructor. 
• Do technical communication certificate instructors have more 
or less professional status than baccalaureate program 
instructors?  
Particularly with the air of suspicion surrounding certificates in 
terms of their perceived quality and their possible implications for the 
material and political status of the field of technical communication, I also 
attempt to address the following, more open-ended and theoretical 
questions: 
• Given their shorter time to completion and their relative lack 
of accreditation and other external oversight, how do certificate 
program curricula rank relative to baccalaureate programs? 
• What are the implications of certificate programs for the 
disciplinary and professional status of technical 
communication? How are certificates poised to impact the 
project of professionalizing the field of technical 
communication?  
• What theoretical models can help us to situate and to make 
sense of certificate programs? In what ways can these models 
guide the development and growth of technical communication 
programs?  
In seeking answers to these questions, I draw on neosophism to 
inform my overall approach. As I detail in the next chapter, a sizable and 
recent intellectual movement is underway to restore the reputation of the 
historically maligned, early Greek sophists. A number of scholars are 
turning to these ancient rhetoricians to develop new conceptions of 
pedagogy and practice for composition-rhetoric, communication, and 
technical communication, among other fields. Particularly after 
modernism, neosophistic scholars find new relevance in the sophists’ 
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socially engaged, politically potent, and thoroughly rhetorical modes of 
teaching and practice. In this study, I seek to join this scholarly movement 
by applying neosophistic theory specifically toward the practical and 
theoretical questions surrounding certificate programs. 
Neosophistic theory informs this study in two key ways. First, I 
explore the productive intersections of feminist theory and neosophistic 
theory in order to articulate a feminist-sophistic research methodology for 
this research. As I describe, such a methodology makes a number of 
notable departures from traditional scientific and academic methods in 
terms of its epistemic stance and rhetorical style. Second, I use 
neosophism as a framework for interpreting the certificate program in 
technical communication itself. Sophistic rhetoric, as Gerald J. Savage 
notes, can act as a valuable tool for theorizing the professional identity of 
the postmodern technical communicator (“Tricksters”). Likewise, I argue, 
it proves to be a valuable tool for theorizing technical communication 
certificate programs. As I conclude, the certificate in technical 
communication can be seen as a particularly sophistic credential for a 
particularly sophistic field. 
In chapter 1, I set the theoretical scene for this study by describing 
neosophistic theory. After characterizing the history of ancient sophists 
and the postmodern context that has led to their contemporary 
reevaluation, I then describe and situate the present research within the 
specific genre of neosophistic appropriation. In chapter 2, I work to 
combine the perspectives of neosophistic rhetorical theory and feminist 
critiques of science to describe a feminist-sophistic methodology for the 
present study, and in chapter 3 I overview the specific strategies I use for 
the rhetorical enactment of such a methodology. In chapter 4, I outline my 
method for surveying programs in the perhaps more traditional terms of 
selecting the sample, composing the survey instrument, and conducting 
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the survey itself. And in chapter 5, I present the major results of the survey 
and I offer some conclusions and overall theoretical reflections on the 
certificate program in technical communication. 
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Chapter 1: 
The Sophists, the Postmodern Context, and 
Neosophism 
 
At the risk of sounding hackneyed and clichéd, I begin the first 
chapter of this work by noting that Webster’s Dictionary (1913) defines 
“sophism” as “The doctrine or mode of reasoning practiced by a sophist; 
hence, any fallacy designed to deceive.” The American Heritage Dictionary 
defines sophism as “A plausible but fallacious argument” or “Deceptive or 
fallacious argumentation.” And Webster’s Third International Dictionary 
(1961) defines sophism as “an argument that is correct in form or 
appearance but is actually invalid; [especially] an argument used for 
deception, disputation, or the display of intellectual brilliance,” or more 
simply, “specious reasoning.” The everyday understanding of sophism is 
decidedly negative: the word is pejorative, equated to deception, chicanery, 
and ethical duplicity. Beneath these unflattering definitions, however, lies 
more than two millennia of accumulated history, including an intellectual 
dispute whose territory is as broad as the foundation of Western 
metaphysics itself. 
As Susan C. Jarratt notes, the actual, historical sophists at the heart 
of these dictionary definitions have been “buried under two millennia of 
neglect, an outcome of the passionate condemnation they provoked from 
two of their contemporaries who have fared better in the histories, Plato 
and Aristotle” (“Rereading” 1; “First Sophists” 67). After modernism, 
however, Plato and Aristotle’s reified position within history—not to 
mention the foundationalist premises of the intellectual tradition they 
advanced—have come under suspicion. This has lead a number of scholars 
to recognize the refigurative potential of the early sophists. Gradually, 
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these scholars are working to rewrite our definitions of sophism as mere 
flattery and chicanery, and are beginning to forge vital connections 
between the sophists’ ancient past and our postmodern present.  
In this chapter, I attempt to set the overall historical and 
theoretical scene for this study by characterizing the contemporary 
movement to resurrect and restore the sophists. I begin by briefly outlining 
the history of the ancient sophists, and I describe the postmodern context 
that has served to draw them back into the purview of serious scholarly 
and intellectual consideration. Then, I attempt to situate the present study 
among contemporary scholarship on the sophists. In doing so, I outline a 
pivotal scholarly debate between the “objectivist” and “rhapsodic” 
historiographic approaches (Consigny, Gorgias). I then review a number of 
works within the genre of “neosophistic appropriation” (McComiskey, 
Gorgias), a scholarly genre made possible by rhapsodic historiography and 
dedicated to applying the ancient sophists toward a number of 
contemporary issues. Finally, I conclude by describing how the present 
study attempts to contribute to this important new genre.  
The Ancient Sophists 
The sophists were traveling teachers and rhetoricians in ancient 
Greece. They were the “visiting professors” of the fifth and fourth 
centuries BCE, teaching their students skills that went beyond the 
traditional curriculum of grammatikē, mousikē, logistikē, and gumnastikē to 
also include preparation for life in the public sphere (Kerferd 17; Matsen 
30). The sophists accompanied great historical and cultural change; they 
flourished as democracy flourished in ancient Greece (Crome 14; Enos 
136; Kerferd 1; Jarratt, Rereading 81). They were travelers, and by no 
coincidence, relativists: they understood that “There is no absolute 
criterion, divine or human, with which to measure any aspect of reality; 
thus there is no certainty beyond the certainty that the world is known 
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differently from place to place” (Pullman 53). The sophists invented the 
profession of teaching, and they offered their instruction to any man who 
was able to pay their fees, regardless of his social status ( Jarratt, Rereading 
82, 84).  
The term “sophist” itself was initially positive, meaning any “wise 
man”; the term “philosopher” too meant simply a “lover of wisdom.” It 
wasn’t until the critiques of Plato and his contemporaries during the 
fourth century BCE that “sophist” came to be widely seen as pejorative 
(Crome 19; McComiskey 3, Jarratt, Rereading 34; Schiappa, Protagoras 4). 
In the dialogue of the Gorgias, Plato’s Socrates declares that rhetoric is not 
a true art because “it can produce no principle in virtue of which it offers 
what it does, nor explain the nature thereof, and consequently is unable to 
point to the cause of each thing it offers” (465a). He goes on to analogized 
rhetoric to “mere cookery” and to denigrate it as a routine, a knack, and a 
false art (462e–463b). Rhetoric, according to Plato, is incapable of 
accounting for its own first principles or productive outcomes in the way 
that a true art, such as medicine, can (Phaedrus 270b). 
In the Phaedrus, Plato’s Socrates advances the distinction between 
dialectic (a philosophic search for Truth) and rhetoric (a mere tool for the 
dissemination of Truth, as found prior through dialectic) (260d). To Plato, 
only a privileged class of philosopher-kings are capable of accessing a 
priori Truth through dialectic, and one of rhetoric’s few capacities for 
virtue is as an instrument of state control: as a means for philosopher-
kings to convey the Truth to those too inferior to access it on their own 
(Black 373–4; Kauffman 106–115). As the lowly, deceptive practices of the 
sophists stand opposed to the lofty goals of philosophy and dialectic 
(Phaedrus 269b), the sophists remain capable of offering only the merest 
appearance of Truth (Gorgias 464b–466a). Combined with no small 
amount of slander—Susan Jarratt notes that Plato’s accounts of the 
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sophists “take on almost monstrous qualities of greed, exhibitionism, and 
deceit” (“First Sophists” 68; “Rereading” 3)—Plato’s critiques placed 
rhetoric and the character of its first teacher-practitioners under an 
enduring pall of opprobrium. By casting the previously benign terms 
“sophist” and “philosopher” so dramatically into opposition, Plato set the 
stage for the lasting condemnation of the sophists through subsequent 
history. 
At the hands of his famous student Aristotle, Plato’s 
foundationalist epistemology evolved subtly, but continued to militate 
against the sophists. To be sure, Aristotle is less directly antagonistic 
toward them than Plato (Pullman 52; Matsen 30; Poulakos, “Rhetoric” 
215) and his theories of rhetoric are in some ways consistent with those of 
the sophists (McComiskey, “Toward” 6; McComiskey, Gorgias 6; Allen). 
Nonetheless, Aristotle “toes the party line” by characterizing the sophists 
as artists of deception (McComiskey, Gorgias 2–3) and by upholding 
rhetoric as the undeniably weaker counterpart (antistrophos) to dialectic 
(On Rhetoric 1354a). In Sophistical Refutations, for instance, Aristotle 
equates sophism with fallacy (165a) and makes persistent attacks on the 
sophist’s character, depicting them—much like Plato did—as 
opportunistic, greedy, lying quibblers (171b).  
Together, Plato and Aristotle were instrumental in forging an 
attitude toward the sophists and rhetoric that has served to keep them 
historically on the losing sides of the binaries of rhetoric/dialectic and 
philosophy/sophistry. As George L. Pullman maintains,  
The traditional thinking is that Platonic and Aristotelian 
rhetorical theory disciplined the sophists’ extravagant 
practices, substantiated their unsubstantiated claims, and 
transformed their dithyrambic, magical, poetic discourse 
into a logical, rational theory of argumentation. In other 
words, Plato and Aristotle transformed mythos into logos. 
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[…] Because the Western intellectual tradition has tended 
to lionize Plato and Aristotle and the positive 
epistemologies they fostered, the sophists in general and 
sophistic rhetoric in particular have been much maligned, 
while Plato and Aristotle have largely remained the first 
and the last word on legitimate rhetoric. (50–51) 
In the historical context of postmodernism, however, this traditional 
thinking has begun to be seriously challenged and revised. As Bruce 
McComiskey notes, “a new set of conditions emerged during the latter 
half of the twentieth century, conditions that enabled the critique of 
Plato’s hegemony, foundational epistemologies, and realist rhetorics” 
(Gorgias 58). In the following section, I briefly overview the postmodern 
context that brought about these conditions. 
The Postmodern Context 
The latter half of the previous century witnessed the broad 
intellectual and cultural disruption known as postmodernism. The advent 
of postmodernism has represented a broad disaffection with, and 
paradigmatic break from, the tenets of modernism and Enlightenment 
humanism. The contours of this break are now largely familiar; many of 
postmodernism’s once-radical ideas have become commonplace and its 
critiques have gradually evolved and passed unmarked into our culture. 
Formerly obscure and abstruse postmodern theory has (to some irony) 
been canonized in collections such as the Norton Anthology of Theory and 
Criticism (Leitch), and it has become accessible in textbooks such as The 
Portable Postmodernist (Berger) and even a comic book (Powell). Once-
polarizing ideas such as the celebration of diversity and alterity are now 
the stuff of institutional mission statements. Collaborative, digitally 
mediated projects such as Wikipedia embody the social construction of 
knowledge without any explicit acknowledgement of a postmodern 
theoretical orientation. Meanwhile other digital social networks, 
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commons-based peer productions, and “Web 2.0” phenomena subvert 
modernist notions of the individual genius in their reliance on 
collaboration and the “wisdom of crowds.” To some irony, the success of 
postmodern theory has threatened to render its critiques invisible, and it 
has become easy to overlook postmodernism’s significance to 
contemporary history.  
By way of definition—and by way of reminder to its often tacit 
presence—I offer a brief review of this movement. While broad in scope 
and diverse in its makeup, postmodernism remains a distinct and 
characterizable intellectual-historical phenomenon. To Terry Eagleton, 
“Postmodernism means the end of modernity, in the sense of those grand 
narratives of truth, reason, science, progress and universal emancipation 
which are taken to characterize modern thought from the Enlightenment 
onwards” (Literary 200). Meanwhile, Stanley Aronowitz and Henry A. 
Giroux offer this characterization: 
Postmodernism’s refusal of grand narratives, its rejection of 
universal reason as a foundation for human affairs, its 
decentering of the humanist subject, its radical 
problematization of representation, and its celebration of 
plurality and the politics of racial, gender, and ethnic 
difference have sparked a major debate among 
conservatives, liberals, and radicals in an increasingly diverse 
number of fields. (61) 
Donna Haraway offers a similar characterization of postmodernism, in a 
style perhaps more befitting it: 
If belief in the stable separation of subjects and objects in 
the experimental way of life was one of the defining 
stigmata of modernity, the implosion of subjects and objects 
in the entities populating the world at the end of the 
Second Millennium—and the broad recognition of this 
implosion in both technical and popular cultures—are 
stigmata of another historical configuration. Many have 
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called this configuration “postmodern.” (Modest_Witness 
42) 
Beyond these characterizations, I identify a handful interrelated 
concepts and critiques that are central to postmodernism (and I note some 
of their familiar “-isms” and terminologies as well). Postmodernism 
entails: 
1. a strong skepticism concerning the transparency and 
stability of meaning in language (poststructuralism, 
Derridian différance and deconstruction); 
2. the notion that knowledge is not discovered by individuals 
describing a prior and independent reality, but rather 
knowledge is developed within—and determined by—social 
contexts (social constructionism, Kuhnian paradigm shifts, 
Rortyian pragmatism); 
3. a recognition that certain concepts have been arbitrarily 
privileged over others through history, and that certain 
myths play a determining role in culture (logocentrism, 
Lyotardian metanarratives/grand narratives); 
4. the dissolution of the modernist normative subject, and the 
recognition that subjectivities are socially constituted and 
are without essentiality (the “death of the subject,” 
postcolonialism, the subaltern, the “Culture Wars”); and 
5. a rejection of the inviolability of Enlightenment rationality 
and the supremacy of scientific knowledge 
(antifoundationalism, the “Science Wars,” the Sokal affair, 
pragmatism). 
As these notions migrated and gained broader acceptance at the 
end of the previous century, their ramifications were felt both popularly 
and academically. Outside of the academy, debates raged over “political 
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correctness,” representing a popular engagement with issues concerning 
the referentiality and power of language as well as the politics of 
representation, subjectivity, and diversity. Within the university, the status 
of previously stable categories of knowledge such as culture and science 
shifted. The humanities’ traditional role as a transmitter of supposed 
universal human values came into considerable doubt during the “Culture 
Wars” (Atwill 12). Likewise, critiques of scientific methodology and 
rationality were waged from many corners during the “Science Wars.” 
These critiques of the social, political, and epistemological machinations of 
a once innocent and objective science were offered by numerous scholars 
from the disciplines of feminist studies, the social sciences, the rhetoric of 
science, science studies, science and technology studies, and the 
humanities. 
Within the academic humanities specifically, postmodernism can 
be seen as the motive force behind many recent shifts. As the modernist, 
normative subject dissolved, the formerly cohesive and complete Western 
literary canon was revealed to be a surprisingly racist, classist, sexist, 
homophobic, and ultimately hegemonic construction. Literary studies 
responded to this revelation by diversifying its canon and its methods. The 
burgeoning field of cultural studies abandoned the notion of a text 
altogether—and subsequently dodged the controversy surrounding 
canonicity (see Giroux et al.)—by taking all of culture as a rich “text” for 
critical evaluation. Elsewhere in the humanities, composition studies 
rejected the formalist approaches of current-traditional rhetorics, which as 
Sharon Crowley maintains are complicit in a modern humanist program of 
exclusion (Composition 94–7). Composition studies also moved to abandon 
concepts derivative of the modernist subject, such as “voice” and 
“expression,” and has come instead to embrace social and rhetorical 
concepts such as process, ethos, audience, and collaboration. And consistent 
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with postmodernism’s suspicion of the transparency and stability of 
language, linguists have begun to turn away from reductive notions of 
language such as structuralism and to replace them with more nuanced 
accounts of language use in context such as discourse analysis, pragmatics, 
and sociolinguistics. 
Even technical communication—a discipline born to meet the 
technological and bureaucratic needs emerging during the height of 
modernism at the middle of the twentieth century (see Connors, “Rise”)—
has changed in the face of postmodernism. Much like the field of 
composition, technical communication has evolved away from formalist 
approaches in its scholarship, education, and practice. It has distanced itself 
from what Carolyn Miller calls in her influential 1979 article “A 
Humanistic Rationale for Technical Writing” the windowpane theory of 
language: “the notion that language provides a view out onto the real 
world, a view which may be clear or obfuscated” (611–12). Such an 
outlook holds that language can accurately and unproblematically 
re-present—equally, to all audiences—an objective, real, stable, and 
knowable external reality. Against this view of communication, as Paul 
Dombrowski notes, the postmodern moment has spurred a broad 
awakening to the function of rhetoric in technical communication, even 
“though it was ‘always already’ there (always operative but only recently 
recognized and validated)” (“Post-modernism” 179). Much recent 
scholarship in technical communication joins Miller in her dismissal of the 
windowpane theory, embracing instead approaches rooted in rhetoric.1  
                                                
1 To review the central debates regarding the role of rhetoric in technical communication, 
see the works of John Haage, Robert R. Johnson (“Complicating”; “Johnson Responds”), 
Melinda Kreth, Miller (“Comments”), Patrick M. Moore (“Instrumental”; “Myths”; 
“Response”; “Rhetorical”), and Janice (Ginny) Redish. 
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Particularly as new scholarship emerges urging us to shift our 
attention toward postpostmodernism, a “new” or “leftist” ontology, or 
whatever lies beyond postmodernism (for example, Strathausen)—and 
even as some scholars recant their earlier postmodern and relativistic 
theoretical proclamations (Eagleton, After; Gross)—it is easy to forget just 
how disruptive, historically significant, and ultimately successful 
postmodernism has been. As James Berlin notes, “Far from being the self-
indulgent musings of careerist academics,” the theoretical discussions of 
postmodernism have responded “to alterations in our basic understanding 
of self, society, and the nature of human value fostered by today’s economic 
and cultural conditions” (60). As I discuss in the next section, 
postmodernism has also spurred a large-scale reconsideration of the 
historic sophists, and it has enabled the application of sophistic theory 
toward a wide range of contemporary issues. 
Sophism’s Kairotic, Contemporary Revival 
The context of postmodernism has presented a kairotic moment 
for the reexamination and revival of sophism. Numerous contemporary 
scholars in composition, rhetoric, communication studies, technical 
communication, and the humanities have emerged to resurrect the 
reputation of the sophists against the slanders of Western metaphysics—
scholars such as Michelle Ballif, Scott Consigny, Sharon Crowley, Richard 
L. Enos, Stanley Fish, Susan C. Jarratt, Michael C. Leff, Kenneth J. 
Lindblom, Steven Mailloux, Bruce McComiskey, John Poulakos, Takis 
Poulakos, George L. Pullman, Gerald J. Savage, J. Blake Scott, and Victor 
J. Vitanza, among others. Counter to the characterization of sophists as 
mere flatterers and chicaners, these scholars craft revived narratives of the 
sophists that serve to place them productively within a larger postmodern 
critique. 
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In the accounts of these scholars, the sophists’ presumed defects 
under the hegemonic intellectual shadow of Plato and Aristotle become 
instead virtues: the sophists were generalists, skeptics, and pragmatists; 
they were socially engaged in their teaching and practice; they were 
inherently disruptive and subversive; they were anti-aristocratic, anti-
individualistic, and democratic; and they were relativistic in their 
epistemology. As Sharon Crowley notes,  
Despite its great age, ancient rhetorical theory has much to 
offer postmodernity. Postmodern thought requires attention 
to location and awareness of contingency. Similar 
theoretical habits can be found in what we know of (or can 
read into) the work of ancient rhetorical theorists as well, 
particularly that generated by the Older Sophists. (Crowley, 
Toward 45) 
At the end of modernism, then, the sophists have come to embody a very 
potent and timely corrective to the excesses of foundationalism.  
I won’t attempt a complete rehearsal of the extensive body of 
scholarship re-examining the sophists. (Excellent bibliographies appear in 
Bruce McComiskey’s 2002 volume Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric 
and Steven Mailloux’s 1995 volume Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism.) 
Rather, I focus here on the more specific genre of neosophistic 
appropriation. First, I present a brief examination of the pivotal debates 
that served to justify the methods and aims of this genre. Next, I 
characterize this genre by presenting an overview a number of works 
within this genre that I feel demonstrate the particular applicability of the 
sophists to contemporary history. I then conclude by describing how this 
study seeks to contribute to the genre of neosophistic appropriation. First, 
however, I would like to settle a terminological issue. The contemporary 
movement to resurrect the sophists (and the various strains within this 
movement) are called by a number of different names: “neosophism” 
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(Schiappa), the “Third Sophistic” ( Jarratt; Vitanza), “a new sophistry” 
(Neel 178), “sophistic rhetoric” (Poulakos, Sophistical), “the revival of 
sophistry” and the “new sophistic rhetoric” (McComiskey, Gorgias). As I 
use the term “neosophism” or “neosophistic rhetoric,” I refer to the 
contemporary, revisionist historical movement most broadly.  
Objectivist and Rhapsodic Historiography 
The most pivotal debates in neosophism concern not so much who 
the sophists were in the past, but rather how we come to know them in the 
present. Historical study of the sophists is faced with an immediate and 
formidable methodological challenge: only scant fragments of their work 
survive (R. Sprague). Most of the evidence that we have about the sophists 
is written by their vehement adversary, Plato (Guthrie 9), and is 
“profoundly hostile” (Kerferd 1) in its treatment of them. Further 
complicating matters, the precise meaning of the term “the sophists” is 
itself unsettled, as it “does not refer to a group of closely allied thinkers, 
nor does sophism refer to a distinct school of thought” (Pullman 52; see 
also McComiskey, Gorgias 7). In light of our historical distance from these 
ancient rhetoricians—and in light of the paucity and partiality of our 
extant records—it remains difficult to fashion any historical account of the 
sophists, let alone a redemptive one (Consigny, Gorgias 4–10). As Keith 
Crome analogizes: 
It is perhaps tempting to imagine that the task of [restoring 
the sophists] would be akin to the labour of the picture 
restorer: the delicate removal of the additions of later 
hands—the various veils imposed by more censorious 
eras—or the stripping away of accretions of dirt and 
discouloured varnish, in order to lay bare the original 
painting in the naked glory of its original colours. Nothing 
could be farther from the truth. With the sophists, to strip 
away the additions and accretions would simply leave 
nothing. (15) 
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As a result, neosophistic scholars face what Scott Consigny terms “a 
hermeneutic aporia, or impasse, in that we appear to have no obvious means 
of articulating and defending a particular account” of the sophists (Gorgias 
9). 
At least two contradictory historiographic approaches have 
emerged in response to this impasse: the “objectivist” and “rhapsodic” 
approaches.2 These approaches stand distinct within neosophistic 
scholarship, and have been contested in recent debates among its scholars 
(notably Edward Schiappa and John Poulakos). Most broadly, these 
debates concern whether the practice of historiography has “more to do 
with making than finding, with selection and narration rather than report” 
( Jarratt, “Speaking” 190). The objectivist approach to the historical 
sophists consists largely of the methodology of traditional historiography, 
and it attempts to rely on factual evidence as the sole basis for its 
interpretation. In contrast, the rhapsodic approach denies the possibility 
for objectivity in historical interpretation and remains aware of the 
contemporary significance and application of the history it constructs. 
In terms of its methodological assumptions, the objectivist 
approach maintains that it is possible to re-create the sophists’ history in 
the present using data from the past, and that objective facts should 
                                                
2 Here I adapt and appropriate the terms “objectivist” and “rhapsodic” from Consigny’s 
2001 volume, Gorgias: Sophist and Artist (10–17). In spite of a general consensus 
regarding the makeup of these divergent approaches to historiography, there seems to be 
little agreement about what to call them. For instance, Schiappa refers to “historical 
reconstruction” and “contemporary appropriation” (Protagoras 64); Sharon Crowley refers 
to the “essentialist” and “constructionist” approaches (“Let Me” 8); and in an earlier work 
Consigny refers to the “foundationalist” and “antifoundationalist” camps (“Schipppa’s” 
253). Victor J. Vitanza refers to the “philological-historiographical methodology of 
species-genus analytics (diaresis, dividing practices)” (Negation 123), compared to 
“revisionary” or even “sub/versive” historiographies (“Critical”). Consigny, meanwhile, 
presents his own cataloging of the various titles used for these approaches (Gorgias 
216n29, 216n32). 
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determine and limit our historical understanding of sophism. This 
approach is perhaps best articulated by Edward Schiappa, who notes in his 
1995 book Protagoras and Logos that “The object of sophistic studies […] 
should be a thorough and comprehensive recovery of each Sophist’s 
thinking as far as the available evidence permits. […] What is needed are 
more data and an effort to understand sophistic thinking in its own 
context as best one is able” (81). As Consigny notes, the ultimate goal of 
this approach “is to articulate an objectively valid or ‘correct’ account” that 
is untouched by “our own biased assumptions or conceptual schemes” 
(Gorgias 10). An objectivist approach requires an examination of the 
sophist’s original words (ipsissima verba) while ignoring subsequent 
interpretations and commentary (11). Because its goal is to reconstruct the 
past on its own terms, such an approach “requires some fidelity to the 
methods and practices of classical philology” (Schiappa, Protagoras 66). 
The cardinal sin of the objectivist approach is anachronism, or the 
imposition of present-day frameworks onto historical data. For instance, as 
Schiappa contends, placing Gorgias into “anachronistic categories, like 
‘anti-essentialist’” is anathema to good historical scholarship (207), so too 
is the notion that “current theoretical pieties” (68) such as postmodernism 
should shape the practice of historiography. An objectivist historiography 
should instead aim to be “free from bonds of the present” (69) and to be 
innocent of larger theoretical frameworks or historiographic motives. 
Schiappa denies the redemptive goal of many neosophistic scholars. To 
him, the object of historical scholarship “should not be to redeem or 
condemn the Sophists, any more than the study of any ancient Greek 
philosopher should be to redeem or condemn a given class of thinkers” 
(81). 
Contrasting the objectivist approach is the rhapsodic approach. 
Such an approach is perhaps best articulated by Susan C. Jarratt, who in 
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her 1987 article “Toward a Sophistic Historiography” advances the notion 
of a self-consciously sophistic methodology for the study of history. 
Speaking of the sophists, Jarratt notes that 
They created a discursive practice preceding the hardening 
of generic categories like “history” but always pervaded by 
an awareness of the historical. Thus both a general sophistic 
attitude toward history and specific examples of sophistic 
historical representation will provide the elements of a 
revised historiography for rhetoric. (11) 
Such a historiography, to Jarratt, entails “a redefinition and consequent 
expansion of the materials and subject matters of rhetorical history,” the 
eschewal of our received notions of “progressive continuity,” and “the 
employment of two pre-logical language technai, antithesis and parataxis, 
[to create a] narrative distinguished by multiple or open causality, the 
indeterminacies of which are then resolved through the self-conscious use 
of probable arguments” (11). 
This sophistic approach to historical scholarship resists the 
totalizing and reductive expectation to make history “a complete, replete, 
full, and logically consistent narrative record” (16). It recognizes and takes 
for granted that “The past is not comprehensible to the present except 
through intelligible frameworks; it is simply impossible to reconstruct the 
past as it actually was” (McComiskey, Gorgias 8). Such an approach builds 
historical understanding of sophistic rhetoric not just for its own sake, but 
with a eye toward its own present-day relevance (Hawhee 142; 
McComiskey, Gorgias 55). Counter to the objectivist proscription against 
anachronistic interpretation, Susan Jarratt makes clear her “wish to 
discover who the ‘sophists’ are for us now” (“First Sophists” 70); similarly, 
John Poulakos asserts that “classical rhetoric is not only of the past and 
about the past. It is also about the present and most importantly about the 
future” (“Testing” 176). 
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Debates among proponents of the objectivist and rhapsodic 
approaches took place primarily through the late 1980s and 1990s within 
neosophistic scholarship.3 In terms of the epistemic viewpoints under 
contention—that is, the foundationalist and antifoundationalist 
epistemologies (Consigny, “Edward” 253) represented by each 
historiographic approach—the debates can themselves be seen as a 
rehearsal of the ages-old dispute between sophism and philosophy. 
Although no apparent victors can be said to have emerged from these 
debates, it is clear that proponents of the rhapsodic approach have 
succeeded in advancing the notion—counter to received foundationalist 
epistemologies—that it is possible for historical scholarship to be kairotic 
and engaged rather than timeless and disinterested. In fact, an entire genre 
of scholarship has emerged in recent years employing rhapsodic 
historiography toward contemporary intellectual and political ends, 
establishing the rhapsodic approach as a legitimate scholarly strategy for 
addressing present-day issues. 
The Genre of Neosophistic Appropriation 
 As McComiskey observes, “During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, 
sophistic rhetoric traveled: it was transported from the fifth century BCE 
into twentieth century CE rhetorical theory and composition studies, and 
this process of transportation has enabled new ‘intellectual activities’” 
(Gorgias 57). McComiskey refers to this process of transportation as 
“neosophistic appropriation”: the process of adapting and remolding the 
ancient sophists to suit the particular exigencies of the present (55, 56). In 
                                                
3 See, for instance, the works of  Consigny, John Poulakos (“Interpreting”; “Rhetoric”; 
Sophistical; “Terms”; “Testing”; “Toward”), McComiskey, Schiappa (“Did”; “History”; 
“Neo-Sophistic”; Protagoras; “Some”; “Sophistic”), Richard Marback, Murphy et al., and 
Vitanza (“Critical”; Negation; Writing). 
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this section I outline a handful of scholarly works within the genre of 
neosophistic appropriation, works that are engaged in a diverse range of 
contemporary intellectual and political endeavors: developing a feminist 
composition pedagogy ( Jarratt), building connections to pragmatist 
philosophy and reforming English Studies (Mailloux), creating new 
conceptions of ethical practice for the teaching of technical 
communication ( J. Blake Scott), and developing a deconstructive feminist 
“Third Sophistic” to inform rhetorical education (Ballif ). Although there 
is great breadth in their application, these works are united in that they 
each seek to “‘mine’ sophistic doctrines and historical interpretations of 
these doctrines for theories and methods that contribute solutions to 
problems in contemporary rhetoric” (McComiskey, Gorgias 55). While the 
following works are hardly a complete catalog of scholarship in the genre, I 
believe that they are emblematic of the particular methods, motivations, 
and diverse applications of neosophistic appropriation. 
In her 1991 volume Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric 
Refigured, Jarratt appropriates the sophists for a feminist project of 
revising composition pedagogy. Jarratt notes that “The congruence of 
logo- and phallocentrism places both sophistic rhetoric and woman at the 
negative pole against philosophy and man” (65), and she describes the 
significant theoretical correspondence between the feminist and 
neosophistic projects. She notes that the sophists speak to a number of 
contemporary issues in the teaching of composition, and that “analyzing 
the relationships among their social theory, their pedagogy, and the 
functioning of democracy in their time can lead to a more pointedly 
political evaluation of the teaching of writing in our own” (xxiv). Jarratt 
offers sophistic rhetoric as a way to counter the “powerful ideology of 
individualism [that] works against a sense of community both in the 
classroom and outside” (88). Taking her cue from the ancient sophists, 
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Jarratt then articulates a feminist/sophistic composition pedagogy as social, 
political, and democratic, and “distinguished from the detachment of 
philosophy in its engagement in social action” (94). Such a pedagogy—
contra feminist pedagogies that “emphasize the nurturing role of the 
writing teacher” (115)—embraces conflict as a vital and distinctly feminist 
defining feature (see also Jarratt, “Feminism”; Jarratt, “Reflections”): 
The discursive method driving both feminist and sophistic 
ways of negotiating change through discourse is argument, 
wherein rhetorical positions stand temporarily as grounds 
for action in the absence of universally verifiable truth. 
When we recognizing [sic] the need to confront the 
different truths our students bring to our classes—not only 
through self-discovery but in the heat of argument—
feminism and rhetoric become allies in contention with the 
forces of oppression troubling us all. (116) 
Meanwhile, in his 1995 edited collection Rhetoric, Sophistry, 
Pragmatism, Steven Mailloux brings together a number of scholars to 
explore the confluence of sophistic rhetoric and neopragmatism. Citing 
pragmatist thinkers from both ends of the 20th century—thinkers such as 
C.S. Pierce, William James, John Dewey, James H. Tufts, F.C.S. Schiller, 
Richard Rorty, and Stanley Fish—Mailloux maintains that 
“neopragmatism can be viewed as a postmodernist form [or reception] of 
sophistic rhetoric” (2; see also Mailloux “Reception” 22). Defining 
pragmatism in 1909, William James writes that “All the pragmatic method 
implies is that truths should have practical consequences […] the word has 
[also] been used more broadly still, to cover the notion that the truth of 
any statement consists in the consequences” (52). Pragmatist epistemic 
viewpoints such as these, as Mailloux and his contributors maintain, are 
theoretically consistent with the doctrines of the ancient sophists. As 
Mailloux suggests, the project of drawing connections between the two can 
speak to the politics of the contemporary, postmodern context: 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
Collective action to change society, affirm cultural values, or 
reform higher education requires some agreement and a 
measure of solidarity. It requires a lot of give-and-take in 
rhetorical negotiation. It cannot be guaranteed by either 
rhetoric or philosophy, by rhetorical pragmatism or 
foundationalist theory. However, some of us working in the 
pragmatist tradition think that at this historical moment a 
strategic emphasis on the first term in each of these pairs 
might enhance the effectiveness of progressive political 
activity in and outside our academic institutions. (21; 
Mailloux “Reception” 41)  
In his 1998 volume Reception Histories: Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and American 
Cultural Politics, Mailloux further articulates how sophistic and pragmatist 
thought can inform our understanding contemporary problems as he 
describes responses to the “Culture Wars” and the need for curricular 
reform in English Studies.  
In his 1995 article “Sophistic Ethics in the Technical Writing 
Classroom: Teaching Nomos, Deliberation, and Action,” J. Blake Scott 
draws on the ancient sophists to articulate a technical communication 
pedagogy that is specifically concerned with ethics. He identifies the 
relativist epistemic stance of the ancient sophists not as “a blatant 
disregard of ethics, but [as] a recognition of the epistemological power of 
language as a sign system” (191). He suggests that the sophists’ reliance on 
nomos, or social convention, as the basis for ethical practice can serve as a 
valid model for contemporary technical communication. As he contends, 
to treat ethics as sophistic  
can empower contemporary technical writing students in at 
least the three following ways: 1) it enables students to 
recognize versions of truth and goodness, including their 
own, as culturally determined rather than physis [i.e., 
determined by nature]; 2) sophistic ethics requires students 
to deliberate about the power and consequences of their 
rhetoric and that of others; 3) through deliberation and 
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responsible action, sophistic ethics invites students to 
participate in the development of nomoi or ethical codes. 
(194) 
Scott notes that the alternatives to such a sophistic conception of ethical 
practice “—all of which foreclose ethical debate—are to ignore ethics 
altogether, to compress all ethics into an utilitarian ethic of expediency, or 
to present an ethical system based on physis” (195). Scott concludes by 
calling for technical communication to incorporate “ethical enculturation” 
into its pedagogy by setting up internships, communicating with 
businesses, having students work collaboratively, teaching case studies, 
using class time to interrogate examples of problematic technical writing, 
and modeling ethical practice as teachers (196–7). 
Finally, in her 2001 volume Seduction, Sophistry, and the Woman 
with the Rhetorical Figure, Michelle Ballif draws from the sophists (and 
Vitanza’s earlier work with the sophists) to develop a fully deconstructive 
“Third Sophistic” rhetoric. Ballif contends that the work of other 
neosophistic scholars has only “sought to codify sophistry—to make it 
something—to give it being and presence” in a metaphysical sense, and to 
“make sophistry into a true technē not a spurious art” (64). For instance, 
counter to Mailloux, Ballif denies the connections between neopragmatism 
and sophism, claiming that neopragmatism is not sufficiently 
deconstructive, nor is it “sophistic enough” (183); she also sees Jarratt’s 
redemptive, feminist attempt at neosophistic appropriation as only serving 
to reinforce the modernist binaries that first enable repression. Instead, 
Ballif offers “Third Sophistic postmodern posthuman transrhetoric(s)” 
(178) as a more radical alternative. This conception of rhetoric seeks to 
“stretch the borders of language, render the code liquid, in order to free us, 
sophistically, from philosophy’s demands for faithful reference and 
undistorted communication and communities” (184). Such a model is 
enacted in part through Donna Haraway’s metaphor of the cyborg and 
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through application of the ancient concepts of metis (cunning) and kairos 
(timeliness). Although deeply theoretical in character, Ballif’s work 
remains conscious of its practical application as it seeks to “question the 
sophists and Plato’s reading of them through the lens of today—of today’s 
argument about subjectivity, agency, and choice in critical pedagogies and 
composition studies” (33). 
While these works are widely divergent in their applications and 
interpretations, they join in the common cause of translating the history of 
the ancient sophists into usable theories and guidelines for the present. 
They also demonstrate that, counter to the methodology of objectivist 
historiography, history can serve in a capacity beyond the mere fashioning 
of “objective facts” about the past. With the present study, I seek to join in 
the rhapsodic and appropriative spirit of these works by employing the 
strategy of neosophistic appropriation toward current questions and 
conversations within the discipline of technical communication. In the 
chapters that follow, I use neosophistic appropriation to connect the 
ancient sophists to contemporary feminist critiques of science, to articulate 
a feminist-sophistic methodology for the present research into technical 
communication certificate programs, and to engage in some rhetorical 
revisioning of the empirical research genre. In addition to using 
neosophistic appropriation to inform the methodology and method of this 
study, I also rely on it as a theoretical lens for interpreting its results at the 
conclusion of this work. 
 I make no pretense in this study to contributing to the important 
genre of objectivist historiography. In this study, I rely largely on secondary 
resources and contemporary commentary on the sophists, mostly works 
employing rhapsodic historiography or themselves contributing to the 
genre of neosophistic appropriation. As I discuss in chapter 3, I also 
attempt to remain self-consciously aware of the audiences, contexts, and 
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purposes of this research; the scholarly conversations that this research 
addresses; and the practical ends this research will support. And while I 
frequently resist the foundationalist impulse toward historical particularity 
and facticity in this work, I believe that this permits me, in turn, to 
integrate and synthesize ideas in ways that can more productively speak to 
contemporary issues and conversations. In adopting these overall 
approaches, I intend to join a recent tradition in neosophistic scholarship 
of “transporting” the ancient sophists into the present. As McComiskey 
notes of the ancient sophists,  
They are here with us, looking over our shoulders as we 
write. The sophists have had profound influences on some 
of the most important developments in rhetorical theory 
and composition studies, and to neglect their journey into 
the twentieth century and beyond would be first, to neglect 
a critical aspect of rhetoric’s history and second, to neglect 
one of the richest historical resources. (Gorgias 141n2) 
In the following chapter, I begin to describe how such a rich historical 
resource will, in part, inform the methodology of the present research 
project.
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Chapter 2: 
Toward a Feminist-Sophistic Methodology 
 
As I noted in the introduction, this study emerges from, and is 
intended to speak to, conversations within the academic field of technical 
communication. Among my most immediate goals is to develop data 
useful to certificate program administrators and to those contemplating 
the establishment of new certificate programs. In particular, I seek to 
develop basic data concerning the curricular and faculty makeup of 
existing certificate programs. But as I first considered the traditional, 
quantitative/empirical methodologies required to develop these data, I 
began to feel uneasy. Many aspects of these methodologies stand opposed 
to emerging postmodern and neosophistic intellectual positions. 
For instance, in their implicit assertion of the ideologies of 
universal truth, objectivity, and an autonomous subject, stock phrases of 
the empirical research report genre such as “the data show” and “it was 
observed” reflect a modernist, Platonic-Aristotelian, and foundationalist 
orientation. I was particularly concerned that I would be compelled by the 
dictates of a traditional methodology to remain absent as an agent—
rhetorically, grammatically, and ethically—in this research. In seeming 
contradiction, I found myself wanting a methodology diverging from 
foundationalism, while simultaneously supporting broad, persuasive claims 
about technical communication programs nationwide. In this chapter, I 
describe my efforts to work out such a methodology. In particular, I 
describe how I find within both neosophism and feminist critiques of 
science the basis for new approaches toward the production of knowledge 
that avoid the totalizing impulses of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition 
while still allowing for the positive production of usable knowledge. 
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In his 1995 article, “Post-Modernism as the Resurgence of 
Humanism in Technical Communication Studies,” Paul M. Dombrowski 
characterizes at least four contemporary intellectual projects emerging 
during the postmodern context: the rhetoric of science, social 
constructionism, feminist critiques of science, and ethical critiques of 
science. As he notes, scholars engaged with these projects 
challenge specifically the notion that “facts” are supposedly 
absolute and pre-existent, on the grounds that this de-
contextualizes facts and tacitly denies the very real social 
contingencies that create facts. From this perspective, facts 
become social artifacts, products for consumption, and 
reinforcers of the value system from which they spring. 
(166). 
As he contends, these four, seemingly disparate projects are united by their 
humanism, a concept that he defines as “the maximization of human 
potential, the affirmation of cultural criticism, and the rejection of rigid 
absolutism” (176). Dombrowski then suggests that postmodernism and 
humanism are themselves, in turn, linked under sophism (177). In the 
same spirit as this broadly integrative and important work, in this study I 
seek to place emphasis on the commonality of specific intellectual projects 
and to work at their shared borders to address contemporary conversations 
in technical communication. 
Although I began by wanting a research methodology more 
consistent with emerging neosophistic and postmodern theories, I believe 
that much of the critical and intellectual work needed to develop such a 
methodology has already been performed under the aegis of feminist 
theory. Specifically, I believe that critiques of science found in feminist 
standpoint theory directly address many of the epistemological and 
methodological issues that I initially sought to address by way of 
neosophism. Further, these critiques contend directly with the traditions of 
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Western science in ways that neosophism immediately does not. In order 
to join forces with this feminist theoretical work already underway, in this 
chapter I draw from—and draw the connections between—both feminist 
critiques of science and neosophistic perspectives to begin to craft a viable 
methodology for the present study. This synthetic methodology is, I 
contend, most aptly described as “feminist-sophistic.”  
Of course, others have already worked to unite these larger 
perspectives: Michelle Ballif relies on neosophistic theory in her 
deconstruction of the very ontic categories of male and female, and Susan 
C. Jarratt is perhaps the single commentator most defined by her work at 
the nexus of neosophism and feminist theory. However, I maintain that 
the combined potential of neosophism and certain feminist critiques of 
science remains largely unexplored. As I will show in this chapter, these 
projects already share considerable ethical, epistemological, and political 
common ground. In addition, the unique methodological insights of 
feminist critiques of science come together with the unique rhetorical 
insights of neosophism to suggest a powerful, antifoundationalist 
methodology. Not only do these projects offer productive critiques of 
traditional research methodologies, but, as I maintain, they ultimately 
suggest new alternatives for more ethical and situated inquiry. 
My Standpoint 
First, to shed some light on the origins of my methodology, I begin 
by very briefly describing my own subject position in terms of both my 
disciplinary/material allegiances and epistemic stance. Beginning with the 
personal is, I admit, anathema to a traditional understanding of 
methodology in which the researcher is held to be wholly independent 
from the act of research and the (purportedly transcendent) knowledge 
that research produces. However, even given the relatively straightforward 
design of the present empirical study, I believe that my subject position 
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and my so-called “personal” stances are determining influences on the 
knowledge claims this study supports. It is for these reasons that I feel 
compelled to foreground my standpoint here. 
By way of intellectual autobiography, I developed as a scholar at 
Midwestern, United States universities within both scientific and 
humanistic contexts. I hold a bachelor’s degree in mathematics and 
computer science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I 
am currently vested in the humanities: I hold a master of arts degree in 
English Studies (specializing in technical writing); as declared on the 
cover page, this work is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for a PhD in Rhetoric and Technical Communication from the 
Department of Humanities at Michigan Technological University; and I 
began a tenure line job in the department of Writing and Rhetoric at 
Oakland University in fall 2008. My material and disciplinary allegiances 
are primarily to the fields of technical communication, rhetoric (in the 
humanities tradition), and composition. 
I would describe myself as a neosophist; a social constructionist; a 
postmodernist; and a third wave, anti-essentialist feminist. I hold that 
knowledge is, by definition, intersubjective, and it is socially constructed. I 
believe that all claims to knowledge are rhetorical, and that rhetoric is 
fundamentally epistemic. It should (but frustratingly, doesn’t) go without 
saying, though: I am not a nihilist. I believe that those who see relativism 
and social constructionism precluding the adjudication of competing 
claims fundamentally misunderstand both concepts. Relativism does not 
mean “anything goes,” and social construction does not mean “arbitrary 
fabrication.” I believe that rhetoric, defined simply as persuasion, is not 
only a sufficient basis for the peaceful adjudication of competing 
knowledge or value claims, it is the only such basis we have ever known. 
As a postmodernist, I eschew notions of the autonomous individual. I 
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likewise deny the modernist myth of objectivity, which holds that 
individuals can transparently describe a prior and independent reality. 
Finally, as a third wave, anti-essentialist feminist, I believe that sex, gender, 
and sexuality are not inviolable consequences of biological nature, but are 
social constructs (which—I’m compelled to repeat the caveat—does not 
imply that they are arbitrary constructs). 
As should be apparent in the sections that follow, the above are 
some of the key material, ideological, and political factors that inform the 
feminist-sophistic methodology I seek to develop. Further, these are the 
factors that I inescapably bring bear on my research—whether 
acknowledged or not. By foregrounding these factors here, my intent is not 
to establish this study as subjective, unreliable, or somehow tainted by the 
personal. Rather, I wish to establish it as intersubjective, situated, and 
emanating from an identifiable subject position. Remaining ethically 
situated and self-consciously rhetorical in these ways are, as I show, key 
components of a feminist-sophistic methodology. 
The Methodological Complementarity of Feminism and 
Neosophism 
On the face of it, there would appear to be fundamental 
discrepancies between feminism and neosophism most broadly. As several 
commentators note, ascribing to the ancient sophists any particular 
political agenda—let alone a feminist or postmodern program—is a 
tenuous undertaking (McComiskey, Gorgias 75; Consigny, Gorgias 9). The 
patriarchal and oligarchic culture of ancient Greece can hardly be called 
“feminist” (Wick 27, Biesecker 99) or even “democratic” (McComiskey, 
Gorgias 140n2) by contemporary standards (see also Crockett 73–5). 
History suggests that “material reality for women in Greek antiquity was 
oppressive” ( Jarratt, Rereading 63) and that education in this historical 
context “was an elitist tradition in which, for the most part, only male 
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children of noble families were permitted to participate” (Crowley, “Plea” 
319). In her book Speaking for the Polis, Takis Poulakos aptly summarizes 
why the contemporary relevance of the ancient Greeks at first appears 
dubious: 
Classical Athens was a slave society, a place where Athenian 
women and non-Athenian-born males were noncitizens 
and where a few landowners and aristocrats maintained a 
stranglehold on the economy while the majority of people 
worked fields in the country, lived as manual laborers, or 
depended on the public treasury for sustenance. It was a 
society driven by war, expansion, conquest, and people who 
understood as an assertion of their own freedom the 
capacity to extend their borders outward and dominate 
others by turning them into slaves or imposing on them 
tributes. From the point of view of our own social values 
and present commitments to equality, there seems to be no 
connection at all, no reason whatsoever to study Classical 
Athens or to expect any similarities between society then 
and now. (2) 
Drawing inspiration from the ancient Greeks—in whose “historical texts 
are the power relations of their day, complete with all of their cruelties and 
injustices” (Vitanza, Writing 118)—would initially seem antithetical not 
only to feminism, but to all progressive, liberatory political projects. 
It’s important to keep in mind, however, that the historical and 
theoretical precedents of the sophists do not offer a literal or totalizing 
model for contemporary practice—even supposing our record of them 
were complete enough to attempt to fashion one. Although I aim to show 
that the theoretical connections between neosophism and feminist 
critiques of science are multiple, the connections between the ancients 
themselves and contemporary feminist projects remain appropriative at 
best. Alluding to this, Jarratt notes that “though the sophists may not be 
‘feminists,’ current feminists are becoming sophists in the best sense of the 
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word by describing rhetorical solutions to the crucial problems of defining 
a theory with the most power for changing women’s lives” (Rereading 79). 
As I draw connections between the two perspectives in the following 
sections, then, I do so not to (further) fetishize a hegemonic rhetorical 
history, but to critically appropriate from it in order to develop usable 
theories for the present. 
Some commentators maintain that by directly taking on the 
Platonic-Aristotelian intellectual tradition, the very premise of 
neosophism represents a feminist political project. As Jarratt notes in 
Rereading the Sophists, 
Indeed, Plato and Aristotle defined philosophy through the 
exclusion of rhetoric as the degraded term. For Plato, the 
sophists signified opinion as opposed to Truth, the 
materiality of the body (e.g., in association with cooking 
and cosmetics) vs. soul, practical knowledge vs. science, the 
temporal vs. the eternal, writing (explicitly as an artificial 
aid to memory) vs. speech (as the vehicle of intuited 
knowledge). This cluster of terms coincided on many 
counts with the cultural stereotype of the “feminine” 
operative in the West for centuries. (65) 
Jarratt further notes the gendered implications of Plato’s comparisons: 
“Both rhetoric and women are trivialized by identification with sensuality, 
costume, and color—all of which are supposed to be manipulated in 
attempts to persuade through deception” (65).4 In their shared opposition 
                                                
4 For a contrasting perspective, see C. Jan Swearingen’s “Plato’s Feminine: Appropriation, 
Impersonation, and Metaphorical Polemic.” While admitting that “Plato is a prime 
progenitor of masculine logo- and phallo-centrism” (109), Swearingen downplays Plato’s 
apparent misogyny. Countering Jarratt’s assertion that Plato’s metaphors for rhetorical 
practice are “feminine” and trivializing, she urges us to read the metaphors and the 
women characters in his dialogues as more positive acts of appropriation. She notes that 
our tendency as modern readers to read Plato as “male” is a result of his intellectual 
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to many of the Platonic ideals of the Western intellectual tradition, then, 
we can see an immediate cause common to both neosophism and 
feminism broadly. 
But more particular aspects of neosophism overlap with feminist 
critiques of science as well. Voices in each project foreground the role of 
the social in epistemology (including in their embrace, to varying degrees, 
of relativism; in their critiques of modernist, scientific objectivity; and in 
their recognition of the social construction of knowledge). Voices in each 
project eschew an epistemology defined by essences, as evidenced by their 
common critical interrogation of the concepts nature and culture (or, physis 
and nomos). And finally, while both projects offer compelling critiques of 
our received epistemologies, they also demonstrate a commitment to 
developing new, more responsible forms of developing knowledge. That is, 
even while both projects can be considered devastating in their assessment 
of traditional epistemologies, unlike Derridian deconstruction and similar 
“acid tools of postmodern theory” (Haraway, Simians 157) both present 
optimism toward the possibility of meaning-making and suggest new, 
positive epistemologies to displace those that they critique. I discuss each 
of these specific areas of congruence in further detail in the following 
sections. 
A Shared Recognition of the Social Situation of Knowledge 
Production 
In the previous chapter, I explored the emergence of neosophism at 
the latter half of the twentieth century. Susan Hekman notes that, during 
this time, “a paradigm shift has been under way in epistemology, a 
movement from an absolutist, subject-centered conception of truth to a 
                                                                                                                     
legacy: a product of the “increasingly masculinist philosophical tradition that he 
inaugurated” (115). 
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conception of truth as situated, perspectival, and discursive” (“Truth” 233). 
This paradigm shift entails a recognition that our traditional activities of 
knowledge production and research fall short of their purported abilities to 
transcend social context. As Sandra Harding notes in her introduction to 
The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader, 
The idea that the very best research, no less than the worst, 
does and should “speak” from particular, historically 
specific, social locations has been out of the question for 
standard research norms. […] the whole point of scientific 
knowledge in the Modern West, in contrast to “folk 
knowledge,” is supposed to be that its adequacy should 
transcend the particular historical projects that produce it 
or, at any given moment, happen to find itself useful. (4) 
Counter to the decidedly Platonic notion of truth as eternal and prior 
which informs the Western model of knowledge Harding characterizes 
here—and consistent with the emerging paradigm that Hekman 
identifies—both neosophism and feminist critiques of science hold that 
knowledge claims are born of and bound to particular social contexts. 
Many feminist critiques of science begin with the material and 
social aspects of knowledge production, most particularly those aspects 
that serve to subjugate and marginalize women. Doing more than just 
pointing out simple instances of “bias” or “bad science” (Haraway, Simians 
186; Harding, “Introduction” 4; Harding, Science 138; Alcoff and Potter 
30), however, such critiques go on to deeply problematize our received 
epistemologies of scientific objectivity by establishing their foundation in 
the material and social. As Lorraine Code notes, these feminist critiques 
have demonstrated that the ideals of the autonomous 
reasoner—the dislocated, disinterested observer—and the 
epistemologies they inform are the artifacts of a small, 
privileged group of educated, usually prosperous, white men 
[…]. Their circumstances enable them to believe that they 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
are materially and even affectively autonomous and to 
imagine that they are nowhere or everywhere, even as they 
occupy an unmarked position of privilege. (21) 
Feminist standpoint theory (which grew from the work of Patricia Hill 
Collins, Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, Nancy C.M. Hartsock, and 
Dorothy E. Smith, among others) further refines this broad epistemic 
critique by maintaining that the practices of scientific research and 
knowledge production are tied—materially, socially, and politically—to the 
subjectivity of researchers working from specific standpoints. 
Early proponents of standpoint theory claimed an epistemological 
superiority for research performed from standpoints of the marginalized 
(Hekman, “Truth” 227). For instance, Allison M. Jaggar, in her 1983 
article “Feminist Politics and Epistemology: The Standpoint of Women,” 
holds that “the special social or class position of women gives them a 
special epistemological standpoint which makes possible a view of the 
world that is more reliable and less distorted than that available either to 
capitalist or to working-class men” (56). Jaggar continues: 
The standpoint of the oppressed is not just different from 
that of the ruling class; it is also epistemologically 
advantageous. It provides the basis for a view of reality that 
is more impartial than that of the ruling class and also more 
comprehensive. It is more impartial because it comes closer 
to representing the interests of society as a whole […]. (57) 
As Susan Hekman maintains in her 1997 article “Truth and Method: 
Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited,” however, standpoint theory has 
evolved away from its initial impulse toward universal truth, impartiality, 
and privileged perspectives as found in Jaggar’s position. She contends 
that, “The new paradigm of knowledge of which feminist standpoint 
theory is a part involved rejecting the definition of knowledge and truth as 
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either universal or relative in favor of a conception of all knowledge as 
situated and discursive” (234). 
Although feminist standpoint theory is multiple in its stances—
and is perhaps more akin to a nuanced conversation than it is to simple 
sloganeering (Mann and Kelly 392)—it presents a consistent epistemic 
critique foregrounding the role of the social in knowledge production. 
Likewise, neosophistic theorists recognize within the ancient sophists a 
vital epistemology that, counter to our received Platonic-Aristotelian 
epistemologies, is discursive and socially situated. For these scholars, the 
sophists present an ancient historical precedent for, and a metaphorical 
embodiment of, epistemic critiques emerging during the postmodern 
moment. 
The ancient sophists present some fairly direct evidence—
inasmuch as our historical record of them of them can be considered 
“direct”—that they viewed knowledge construction as a social process. 
Several scholars (Mailloux, Rhetoric; Jarratt, Rereading; McComiskey, 
Gorgias; Pullman) point to Protagoras’ famous fifth century dictum, “Man 
is the measure of all things” (antrhôpos metron) as evidence of a relativistic 
stance for Protagoras and the ancient sophists. Although there is 
considerable debate over the status of the word “man” as a collective noun 
or not (Guthrie 188; Mailloux, Rhetoric 10), it is clear from this dictum 
that Protagoras believed that humankind “determined the contents of 
reality for itself” (Pullman 54). Likewise, drawing from Mario 
Untersteiner, Susan Jarratt interprets Protagoras’ saying “Concerning the 
gods, I cannot know either that they exist or that they do not exist, or what 
form they might have, for there is much to prevent one’s knowing” (R. 
Sprague 20) as a “Careful expression of ignorance [that] directs energy 
away from the search for an external knowledge source and throws the 
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responsibility for determining the nature of things onto humans” 
(Rereading 50). 
Similarly, in his volume Gorgias: Sophist and Artist, Scott Consigny 
analyzes Gorgias’ extant fragments in order to join in the “interpretive 
game” of making sense of this early sophist and his doctrines. Consigny 
draws from The Encomium of Helen to argue that Gorgias—reflecting a 
trait we can see in contemporary feminist critiques—was skeptical of the 
practitioners of science in his day: 
Gorgias does not construe science as an empirical study 
[…] wherein one attains an increasing approximation of the 
“real nature of things”; and he does not construe scientific 
discourse as the articulation or communication of such 
truths. Instead, he suggests that scientific discourse, like the 
discourse of poets, philosophers, and popular orators, is 
thoroughly rhetorical, concerned with demolishing opinions 
and displacing them with others. (59) 
By establishing scientific knowledge-making as rhetorical in this way, 
knowledge production comes to be seen occurring at the sites of the 
communal and public. To Consigny, “Rather than originating from a 
solitary inward experience or a journey beyond the everyday, Gorgias 
indicates that the origin of his speech lies entirely within an established 
and recognized agon” (83). Furthermore, 
The community or audience is engaged in the process of 
inquiry from the very inception of the agon, for it is their 
beliefs that demarcate the conceptual site of the inquiry. It 
is within the domain of the audience’s beliefs that the 
rhetors operate, and if they “stray” from this domain of 
beliefs, they risk losing the contests. (84) 
Ultimately then, we can see Gorgias holding truth not as emanating from 
individual observers in the form of empirical, objective facts, but closer to 
holding “truth as an endorsement awarded by a community to an account 
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that it finds most persuasive” ( Jarratt, Rereading 60). Neosophistic scholars 
find within these Gorgian epistemological stances the historical precedents 
for postmodern conceptions of knowledge production as socially situated 
and discursive. These stances are likewise common to many feminist 
theoretical voices. 
A Shared Interrogation of the Concepts Nature and Culture 
In addition to drawing our attention toward the social dimension 
of knowledge production, both neosophistic rhetoric and feminist critiques 
of science can be seen to reject an epistemology predicated on essences. 
This is evidenced by both projects’ preoccupation with “exploring physis 
and nomos” (Wick 30)—that is, the respective concepts of “nature” and 
“culture.”5 Of course, these two terms are of immediate concern for many 
feminist projects, and represent the conceptual sites of much of feminism’s 
political agon. As Susan Hekman notes in her 1990 book Gender and 
Knowledge: Elements of a Postmodern Feminism: 
The dichotomy between nature and culture as it has been 
articulated in western thought since Plato is defined by the 
masculine/feminine dichotomy and characterized by the 
assumption that woman has an essential nature that is 
linked in some special way to the natural world. […] 
Furthermore, the notion that woman does have a special 
nature and that this nature does and should define her 
social role, is, like the link between woman and nature, 
rooted in the origins of western thought. (135–6) 
                                                
5 According to W.K.C. Guthrie, physis “can be safely translated ‘nature,’ though when it 
occurs in conjunction with nomos the word ‘reality’ will sometimes make the contrast 
more immediately clear” (55). Nomos, as Jarratt defines it, “refers to provisional codes 
(habits or customs) of social and political behavior, socially constructed and historically 
(even geographically) specific” (Rereading 74). I will move unmarked between the 
correlating English and Greek terms here. 
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At issue is the extent to which difference is seen as premeditated by the 
natural (essentialism) or the extent to which it is socially constituted 
(social constructionism). Feminist considerations of this dichotomy have 
led to a critical examination—and in some cases deconstruction—of the 
very categories nature and culture. 
For example, socialist-feminist critic Donna Haraway offers a 
potent exploration and deconstruction of the nature/culture binary in her 
1991 collection of essays Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, a project to which 
she holds is “about the invention and reinvention of nature—perhaps the 
most central arena of hope, oppression, and contestation for inhabitants of 
the planet earth in our times” (xi). In this project, she demonstrates how 
conceptions of “nature” (constructed against a counterpart “culture”) have 
broad implications for science, technology, gender, identity, sexual politics, 
and other significant loci of contest within feminist theory. 
In an essay examining studies in biology and sociobiology, for 
instance, Haraway explores how our supposedly disinterested scientific 
study of the “natural world” serves to rationalize and reinscribe unjust 
human social orders. Drawing from primate bioantrhopology, biology, 
medicine, and elsewhere, she demonstrates how scientific, “sociobiological 
reasoning applied to human societies easily glides into facile naturalization 
of job segregation, dominance hierarchies, racial chauvinism, and the 
‘necessity’ of domination in sexually based societies to control the nastier 
aspects of genetic competition” (67). In her essay “‘Gender’ for a Marxist 
Dictionary: The Sexual Politics of a Word,” Haraway traces the evolution 
of the sex-gender distinction and its historical intertwining with the 
concepts of nature and culture. And, of course, her most familiar (and 
vivid) embodiment of the deconstructive impulse is her metaphor of the 
Cyborg: within this figure (among other Western binarisms) “Nature and 
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culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for 
appropriation or incorporation by the other” (151). 
The ancient sophists were similarly concerned with the concepts of 
nature and culture, including the particular ways that these concepts came 
to determine social orders. As W.K.C. Guthrie notes in his volume The 
Sophists, the terms nomos and physis 
are key-words—in the fifth and fourth centuries one might 
rather say catch-words—of Greek thought. In earlier 
writers they do not necessarily appear incompatible or 
antithetical, but in the intellectual climate of the fifth 
century, they came to be commonly regarded as opposed 
and mutually exclusive: what existed ‘by nomos’ was not ‘by 
physis’ and vice versa. (55) 
As Guthrie describes it, in ancient Greece “Once the view had gained 
currency that laws, customs and conventions were not part of the 
immutable order of things, it was possible to adopt very different attitudes 
toward them” (21). As the conceptual distinctions emerged between nature 
and culture, many began to question things previously held only to be of 
natural or divine ordinance, such as the existence of the gods, the creation 
of states, divisions within the human race, the inevitability of human rule 
over others, etc. (57–8). 
By throwing into doubt the primacy of physis in human affairs and 
by presenting the possibilities attendant to nomos, the sophists were able to 
employ “narratives to radically reconstruct their own histories in terms 
which opened space for difference” ( Jarratt, Rereading 74). Again, while no 
figures in ancient Greece would likely be called liberatory or progressive by 
today’s standards, the sophists were able to at least question the presumed 
natural origins of social divisions. Referring to Gorgias’ Encomium of 
Helen, Susan Jarratt notes that 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
In Gorgias’s imaginative reconstruction of Helen’s 
abduction, desire, will, and language throw open the 
traditional causal logic of her case and, in so doing, dislodge 
a mythic source for misogynism. In Protagoras’s revisionary 
retelling of the Promethean creation myth, we find laid out 
the process for the social construction of identity: an 
explanation of how family and school teach codes which 
determine the modes of expression available. (Rereading 75) 
Likewise, the sophist Antiphon employed the physis-nomos distinction to 
argue against notions of “high and low birth,” and to argue that there was 
“no difference in nature between barbarians and Greeks” (Guthrie 24). 
As practicing rhetors, the sophists knew that they only stood to 
gain rhetorical agency by advancing the scope of nomos, since no amount 
of persuasive discourse can successfully argue against immutable physis. By 
bringing social orders previously determined by physis into the realm of 
nomos, the sophists opened them up for rhetorical deliberation, and created 
new possibilities for their construction. Many feminist projects likewise 
recognize that conceptions of nature and culture determine their rhetorical 
agency. While not all feminisms concur, certainly many of the anti-
essentialist, social constructionist viewpoints found within third wave 
feminism work to bring social orders previously determined by nature into 
the realm of culture. Social orders predicated on the constructs of sex and 
gender are then opened for deliberation, and new possibilities are created 
for their construction. These shared interrogations of the concepts nature 
and culture concern more than just social and political possibilities, 
though: they also reflect a antifoundationalist epistemology common to 
voices in feminist theory and neosophism. By recognizing the fluidity and 
constructedness of the categories nature and culture, these voices can be 
seen rejecting an epistemology predicated on the notion of inviolable and 
immutable essences. 
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A Shared Optimism and Commitment to New Epistemic 
Projects 
Finally, even while critical of traditional epistemologies, voices 
from feminist critiques of science and neosophism are consistent in their 
optimism toward the possibility for meaning-making and—unlike certain 
postmodern projects—attempt to create new frameworks for the creation 
of knowledge. Neosophism, in spite of the overall epistemological 
relativism it presents, can be seen as very much concerned with the 
creation of (if not eternal, then at least provisional) truths. Likewise, 
several feminist critiques of science work to fashion new and productive 
models for research, even as they stand in critical opposition to traditional 
methods. Both of these critical approaches, in turn, suggest positive 
responses to the epistemic dilemmas presented by postmodernism.  
As Consigny notes, the prospects of a sophistic epistemology may 
at first seem to be quite dismal: If Gorgias 
repudiates the foundationalist notion that there is a truth in 
the world that is independent of our contingent discourses, 
it would seem that he rejects the possibility of truth, 
knowledge, and meaningful discourse altogether. As such, 
he would seem to abandon us to a radical solipsism, in 
which we are not only prevented from apprehending 
anything about the world itself, but in which we are 
prevented from experiencing kairotic moments that are 
replete with meaning. Unable to apprehend or experience 
the truth, we would appear to be condemned […]. (73) 
But Consigny contends that this is not the actually the case, as Gorgias 
views the agon as a viable and meaningful source of truth (73–4). Likewise, 
as Jarratt notes, “Despite the radical propositions of On the Nonexistent, 
often taken to lead to complete solipsism, Gorgias does not deny any 
possibility for communication” (Rereading 55). And Bruce McComiskey 
suggests that, “Although Gorgias is clearly an ontological skeptic, he is 
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not, as is often incorrectly assumed, an epistemological skeptic” (Gorgias 
35; “Toward” 8). These characterizations run counter to many prevalent 
depictions of Gorgias as a “glib nihilist who advanced no positive theories” 
(Enos 73).  
Similarly, sophistic theory productively addresses a more recent 
epistemic impasse. In her 1992 article “The Praise of Folly: The Woman 
Rhetor, and Post-Modern Skepticism,” Patricia Bizzell notes that, while 
the perspective of Derridian deconstruction is “a liberating one, freeing us 
from oppressive traditional sexisms, racism, classisms, and other culturally 
sanctioned forms of discrimination and exploitation” (14), it nonetheless 
seems to tear down without building up, to undermine our 
confidence in the possibility of shared mental powers and 
egalitarian values that would enable people to work toward 
a new and more just social order. […] Enveloped by an 
otherwise anti-position-taking theoretical climate, we 
nevertheless find ourselves wanting to advocate positions. 
(14–15). 
Bizzell’s critique is that deconstruction appears to leave little space left for 
political agency; she compares the postmodern stance to Pyrrhonian 
skepticism: a radical form of skepticism that doubts whether anything can 
ever be known at all (9). 
In his 1996 article “Toward a Neosophistic Writing Pedagogy,” 
Kenneth J. Lindblom directly responds to Bizzell’s critique. As a solution 
to the apparent impasse presented by postmodern deconstruction, 
Lindblom suggests turning toward “the early Greek sophists,” who he 
believes “offer a theoretical base to Bizzell and all of us who are interested 
in professing left-oriented values in our writing classrooms” (93). 
Developing “a sophistic understanding of the progress of knowledge,” he 
suggests, “can enable us to avoid the trap of Pyrrhonian skepticism” (93). 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
Lindblom demonstrates specific teaching methods that he considers to be 
sophistic in construction, and concludes by asserting that 
The constant attention to the sociopolitical construction of 
knowledge that a neosophistic pedagogy demands explicitly 
and unquestionably interconnects the operations of 
communities and the operations of writers, making 
sociopolitical action not only a valid element but a 
necessary component of composition curricula. (105) 
The answer to the postmodern impasse for Lindblom, then, lies in the 
historical precedent of the sophists. Again, while he speaks specifically 
about their application in composition, we can see Lindblom’s turn toward 
the sophists suggesting a broader, productive epistemology beyond the 
classroom. To him, the sophists represent a legitimate source of political 
agency, and authorize us to take stances and hold values in Derrida’s 
deconstructive wake. 
The sophists and neosophism can ultimately be seen as retaining 
an optimism toward the possibility of persuasion and truth, an optimism 
that is alien to deconstruction.6 As Jasper Neel maintains, “In contrast to 
Derrida […] the sophists allow themselves to be persuaded by an argument, 
while never forgetting the inadequate, deceitful foundation that enabled 
                                                
6 I do not intend to imply a dualism between neosophism and Derridian 
deconstruction—these antifoundationalist projects are in many ways quite 
complimentary. In fact, Victor J. Vitanza warns us against dividing the two in his 1997 
volume Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric: “Those of us in rhetoric 
im/proper need to understand that the argument to reject deconstruction would be 
comparable to the argument to reject rhetoric itself because it has no content, truth, and 
politics!” (213). (Vitanza’s playful, punning, and sometimes frustrating writing style 
echoes Derrida’s own, and is intended to remind us that postmodern academic prose 
styles find historical precedent in the dithyrambic, “Gorgian” oratory style of the ancient 
sophists.) Derrida himself, however, does not see deconstruction as a new sophistic 
project. In his Dissemination he notes that the work is “at no time spurred on by some 
slogan or a password of a ‘back-to-the-sophists’ nature” (108). 
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the argument” (207, emphasis added). To Neel, sophism embraces the 
possibility of meaning-making, but as he also clearly implies, this 
optimism does not come at the expense of its central criticalness. 
Feminist standpoint theory similarly retains an optimism toward 
the possibility of knowledge creation, even as it is critical of traditional 
epistemologies. Much like Bizzell, Haraway is also troubled by the 
postmodern impasse. In her much-cited article “Situated Knowledges: The 
Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective” 
(first published in 1988), Haraway writes: 
I, and others, started out wanting a strong tool for 
deconstructing the claims of hostile science by showing the 
radical historical specificity, and contestability, of every layer 
of the onion of scientific and technological constructions, 
and [instead] we end up with a kind of epistemological 
electro-shock therapy, which far from ushering into the 
high stakes tables of the game of contesting public truths, 
lays us out on the table with self-induced multiple 
personality disorder. (Simians 186) 
Like Bizzell, Haraway is troubled by how the “acid tools of critical 
discourse in the human sciences” (185) have seemingly eaten away at the 
foundations of political agency and our grounds for making claims to 
knowledge. She articulates the dilemma facing us as “how to have 
simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all claims” 
on one hand, while retaining “a no-nonsense commitment to faithful 
accounts of a ‘real’ world” on the other hand (187). 
Haraway’s response to this dilemma is to develop a critical, yet 
positive epistemology, which she articulates as feminist objectivity rooted 
in situated knowledges. In such an epistemology, rather than being 
minimized or ignored as in traditional Western approaches, attention is 
actually drawn toward the subjectivity and situatedness of the knowledge 
producer—so that “partiality and not universality” then becomes “the 
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condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims” (195). She 
notes: 
All Western cultural narratives about objectivity are 
allegories of the ideologies of the relations of what we call 
mind and body, of distance and responsibility, embedded in 
the science question in feminism. Feminist objectivity is 
about limited location and situated knowledge, not about 
transcendence and splitting of subject and object. In this 
way we might become answerable for what we learn how to 
see. (190) 
Haraway then identifies a historical precedent for the epistemic practice 
that she describes. Parallel to Neel’s characterization of a sophistic 
epistemology that recognizes the “deceit” inherent to all knowledge claims, 
Haraway notes that “The Coyote or Trickster, embodied in American 
Southwest Indian accounts, suggests our situation when we give up 
mastery but keep searching for fidelity, knowing all the while we will be 
hoodwinked” (199). Although the models and metaphors that Haraway 
offers are decidedly positive, as with neosophism , their optimism toward 
meaning-making does not come at the expense of their central criticalness. 
Haraway joins a number of other feminist critiques in adopting 
such an optimistic epistemic stance. In The Science Question in Feminism, 
Sandra Harding writes: 
I do not wish to be understood as recommending that we 
throw out the baby with the bathwater. We do not imagine 
giving up speaking or writing just because our language is 
deeply androcentric; nor do we propose an end to 
theorizing about social life once we realize that thoroughly 
androcentric perspectives inform even our feminist 
revisions of the social theories we inherit. Similarly, I am 
not proposing that humankind would benefit from 
renouncing attempts to describe, explain, and understand 
the regularities, underlying causal tendencies, and meanings 
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of the natural and social worlds just because the sciences we 
have are androcentric. (10). 
Even while participating in a direct critique of traditional scientific and 
empiricist methodologies, Harding asserts the “need to work out an 
epistemology that can account for both this reality that our best 
knowledge is socially constructed, and also that it is empirically accurate” 
(“Introduction” 12). She offers her own critical, yet productive 
epistemology through the notion of strong objectivity: a feminist epistemic 
stance which sees knowledge as “fully saturated with history and social life 
rather than abstracted from it” (“Rethinking” 128). 
Similarly, Kathi Weeks asserts the possibility of political agency 
and meaning-making when she notes our desire to “endorse the critiques 
of humanism, functionalism, determinism, and essentialism without 
denying the possibility of agency” (181). As Susan Hekman notes, “the 
postmoderns are correct: we live in a world devoid of a normative 
metanarrative. But we can offer persuasive arguments in defense of our 
values and the politics they entail” (“Truth” 238). And as Linda Alcoff and 
Elizabeth Potter maintain, feminist epistemological projects have “sparked 
a determination to reconstruct epistemology on newer, more self-conscious 
ground” (3). So, while many feminist critiques are damning of our received 
epistemologies, they also express a consistent optimism toward the 
prospect of political agency and toward the possibility of knowledge 
construction. This optimism, which is shared with many neosophistic 
projects, stands as a compelling response to the postmodern impasse. 
Conclusion 
By showing—in parallel—the epistemic traces common to both 
feminist critiques of science and neosophism, my intent in this chapter has 
been twofold. First, I have sought to establish the overall methodological 
complementarity of these two intellectual and political projects. Second, I 
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have sought to describe the epistemic assumptions upon which a feminist-
sophistic methodology is based. Such a methodology explicitly 
foregrounds the role of the social in epistemology; denies any notion of 
inviolable essences as the basis for epistemology; and not only remains 
optimistic toward the possibility of meaning-making, but works actively to 
create new epistemologies. Such a methodology stands in opposition to 
traditional, foundationalist methodologies predicated on the modernist 
notions of the autonomous subject and objectivity. In the next chapter, I 
will work from the feminist-sophistic ideals sketched in this chapter 
toward enacting them rhetorically in method. As I show, such a method 
demands new critical attention to the ethical posture of researchers and 
their presence as an agent within published research, demands recognition 
of the practical disciplinary contexts that researchers address, and demands 
a vigilant awareness of the rhetoricity of all scholarship. 
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Chapter 3: 
Rhetorically Enacting a Feminist-Sophistic Method 
 
In the previous chapter, I described the overall epistemic stance 
that informs this study. I argued that the connections between neosophism 
and feminist critiques of science are multiple and complimentary, and, 
taken together, these perspectives suggest the need for new epistemologies 
to displace our received Platonic-Aristotelian tools for knowledge 
production. I noted my wish to join feminist and neosophistic projects not 
only in their critical opposition to many traditional epistemologies, but 
also in their optimism toward the possibility of meaning-making and their 
efforts to actively develop new ways of knowing. But most importantly, I 
wish to engage in the sort of situated, ethical research that I find these 
projects endorsing. In this chapter, I work from the feminist-sophistic 
principles described in the previous chapter to describe their enactment in 
method. More specifically, I describe how these principles are realized in 
terms of the rhetorical stance I assume as a researcher. 
My primary goal as a rhetor-researcher is to avoid what Donna J. 
Haraway terms the “god-trick”: the act of producing knowledge that 
pretends “to be from everywhere and so nowhere, to be free from 
interpretation, from being represented, to be fully self-contained or fully 
formalizable” (Simians 196). Similarly, paraphrasing Gorgias’ On Nature or 
the Non-Existent, Bruce McComiskey asserts that in the genre of 
neosophistic appropriation, 
Historical reality does not exist in any essential form; even if 
historical reality exists, historians can not know it except 
through the process of interpretation; even if historians can 
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know historical reality as it exists external to interpretation, 
they cannot convey that historical reality to another person, 
since language, like reality, is always interpreted. (Gorgias 
56) 
More pointedly, he notes, reality “is always already a politicized 
representation with no originary presence” (80). Drawing from both 
feminist and neosophistic stances, I attempt to remain mindful in this 
study of the fact that the contemporary historical instance I examine “does 
not exist in any essential form,” and that even if it did, I “can not know it 
except through the process of interpretation” (56). To attempt otherwise, 
as Haraway might note, is to attempt the god-trick. It is the ethical and 
rhetorical posture of the god-trick that I believe a feminist-sophistic 
method is ultimately articulated against. 
In composing this study, I have done my best to avoid the 
rhetorical moves common to god-trick scientific narratives. I try to resist 
using the passive voice to disguise my own interpretive role as a researcher, 
and I try to avoid the other familiar conceits of academic and scientific 
report genres that would serve to obscure this study’s constructedness. I 
attempt to couch my findings not as universal truths, but as paths for 
moving forward in the conversation of a disciplinary community. And I try 
to remain self-consciously aware that this study is a thoroughly rhetorical 
act—it is only a single, (hopefully) persuasive account that I’ve composed 
for specific audiences and specific purposes. I believe that these 
approaches, which I will discuss in detail in the following sections, are 
necessary to remain consistent with the feminist-sophistic principles I 
outline in the previous chapter. 
A Caveat 
I begin with a caveat. Although I adopt a critical stance toward 
traditional scientific epistemologies—and I take notable departures from 
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traditional scientific methodologies—I do not wish to contribute to facile 
generalizations and stereotyping about the epistemic activities of the 
sciences, or to reduce nuanced considerations of epistemology to “us vs. 
them” battles over academic turf. From C. P. Snow’s “two cultures,” to the 
Sokal Affair and the “Science Wars” of the 1990s, there is no shortage of 
recent warrants to further dichotomize the scientific and humanistic 
perspectives. As Haraway bemusedly confesses, she has, at times, held her 
own “paranoid fantasies and academic resentments” toward those in 
scientific fields: 
The imagined ‘they’ constitute a kind of invisible 
conspiracy of masculinist scientists and philosophers replete 
with grants and laboratories; and the imagined ‘we’ are the 
embodied others, who are not allowed not to have a body, a 
finite point of view, and so an inevitably disqualifying and 
polluting bias in any discussion of consequence outside our 
own little circles, where a ‘mass’-subscription journal might 
reach a few thousand readers composed mostly of science-
haters. (Simians 183) 
But like Haraway, I wish to move beyond the scenario depicted in such a 
characterization, and to avoid relying on “the mythic cartoons of physics 
and mathematics—incorrectly caricatured in anti-science ideology as exact, 
hyper simple knowledges—that have come to represent the hostile other 
to feminist paradigmatic models of scientific knowledge” (196). I do not 
want to articulate a feminist-sophistic method against inaccurate or unfair 
depictions of what goes on “on the other end of campus.” 
In fact, despite my own situation within the humanities, I would 
concede that in many ways knowledge produced in the sciences can be 
more self-consciously social, timely, and assailable than knowledge 
produced in the humanities; likewise, scientific research practices can in 
many ways be more situated and responsible. Here I turn to the example of 
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our respective academic editorial styles, the most popular of which are the 
Modern Language Association (MLA) style and the American 
Psychological Association (APA) style. These styles, I believe, reflect some 
of the central epistemic presumptions and scholarly values of the 
humanistic and social scientific traditions.7 In her 2000 volume Composing 
Research: A Contextualist Paradigm for Rhetoric and Composition, Cindy 
Johanek notes that the use of MLA style in rhetoric, composition, and 
literature makes research in those fields appear timeless and unassailable. 
The MLA style manual’s insistence on using the present tense lends cited 
research an aura of eternality, a grammatical feature that suggests “Once it 
is published, it’s published. It’s ‘there.’ Forever” (191). As Johanek notes, 
MLA style 
ties the theories, research, and pedagogies to their authors 
in the present tense as if those authors still believe—still 
currently “live” in—that theory, research, and pedagogy. In 
other words, the present tense that MLA requires for 
treatment of text, is transferred instead, in composition, to 
treatment of authors. As a result, our criticism, citations, and 
use of composition scholarship locks the author—rather 
than the text—in present tense. (191) 
                                                
7 Robert R. Connors provides a compelling account of the history and significance of 
academic citation practices in his 1998 and 1999 articles “The Rhetoric of Citation 
Systems, Part I: The Development of Annotation Structures from the Renaissance to 
1900” and “The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part II: Competing Epistemic Values in 
Citation.” In these articles, Connors works to reveal the material, political, epistemic, 
disciplinary, and practical factors that determine scholarly citation practices. As he notes, 
while these practices have “silently undergirded the enterprise of Western intellectual 
activity” and “Though these systems constrain many of the ways we deal with each other 
and each other’s work, they have largely gone unremarked” (“Part II” 242). 
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At least the within the field of composition, she advocates the use of APA 
style, which instead permits the use of the past and present tenses for 
different contexts and purposes. 
This seemingly minor editorial feature is quite telling. Much 
scholarly work in the humanities, whether consciously or not, reflects a 
Platonic epistemology by adhering to MLA style. Contrary to the sophist’s 
goal of inducing time-bound, kairotic beliefs within an audience through 
rhetoric, Plato insisted on the philosophic goal of discovering eternal 
knowledge (Truth) through dialectic (irrespective of any audience or 
particular “knower”). The use of the present tense in MLA style is arguably 
a latter-day incarnation of Plato’s insistence on the eternality of knowledge 
claims achieved through dialectic: to Plato, true knowledge transcends 
time. Meanwhile, the use of the past tense in APA style—not to mention 
its explicit foregrounding of publication dates within parenthetical 
citations—can be seen as a sophistic epistemic trait: it reflects an 
informing presumption in the social sciences that knowledge claims are 
temporary, assailable, time-bound, and even kairotic.8 
Similarly, the use of MLA style in the humanities can be seen to 
counter feminist epistemologies. Feminist standpoint theory and the 
notion of situated knowledges suggest an explicit foregrounding of the 
subjectivity and positionality of the researcher. By asserting the 
                                                
8 In describing why scientific disciplines were among the first to abandon footnote 
citation styles, Robert R. Connors notes that 
footnote dating obscures chronological relationships, making 
assessments about authorial relations and cumulating knowledge more 
difficult. For the sciences, this lack of easy chronological access was 
keenly felt, because new scientific discoveries do displace older ones, 
and footnotes by 1900 were becoming a very troubling and 
cumbersome way to report that reality. (“Part II,” 223) 
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timelessness and context-independence of scholarly literature through use 
of the present tense, the MLA style precludes the very sort of contextual 
foregrounding that these feminist critiques advocate. The APA style, by 
contrast, at least permits scholars and their ideas to be contextualized 
chronologically by tense. 
The use of verb tense in our academic styles is admittedly only one 
small example —but I believe it demonstrates why it would be unfair and 
inaccurate to critique the epistemic speck in the eye of the sciences (from 
either a feminist or sophistic stance) given the log in the eye of the 
humanities. As humanistic scholarship practices show us, a 
foundationalizing impulse is not the hallmark of traditional science alone. 
So I offer the disclaimer that the feminist-sophistic methods I describe 
should be seen as articulated against not only traditional scientific 
methods, but against foundationalism inscribed in any disciplinary 
tradition. 
Remaining Present in the Text 
In rhetorically enacting a feminist-sophistic method, I first attempt 
to avoid composing this study in ways that conceal my role as a researcher, 
beginning with grammatical agency. As Joey Sprague notes in her 2005 
volume Feminist Methodologies for Critical Researchers: Bridging Differences, 
Passive voice does not just hide the agency of the 
researcher; explanations in the passive voice hide social 
power. […] In passive voice, people are fired or 
impoverished, or rebellions are crushed. There may be 
victims, but there are not clear agents, no one to whom we 
can assign responsibility for outcomes. […] Using passive 
voice when there are clear agents amounts to hiding the 
exercise of power. (24) 
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Although I hold no illusions about the gravity of the research I present 
here—or about the power I hold as a graduate researcher in an obscure 
scholarly niche—I do want to ensure that I remain present as an agent in 
the text of this study. I intend to accomplish this in part by using the active 
voice and the first person singular consistently in this work, with the 
marked exception of a section appearing near the end of the study. 
Although stylistically this approach may be at odds with accepted 
academic and scientific report genres, I intend for my subtle shift in 
grammatical agency to carry with it a (likewise subtle) shift in ethical 
agency. As Haraway notes in her call to develop a feminist objectivity 
rooted in situated knowledges, “Feminists don’t need a doctrine of 
objectivity that promises transcendence, a story that loses track of its 
mediations just where someone might be held responsible for something, 
and unlimited instrumental power” (Simians 187). By “appearing” 
grammatically within the text of this study, I hope to write a story where 
my mediate role is foregrounded and my subjectivity is evident, and I hope 
to at least begin to remain accountable in the way that Haraway calls for.9 
My use of the active voice and the first person are also consistent 
with a sophistic theoretical orientation. In his 1988 volume Plato, Derrida, 
and Writing, Japer Neel explores how voice and textual “presence” work 
within Plato’s Phaedrus. He notes that “Perhaps Plato’s most brilliant 
insight was to realize how difficult disputing his texts would be if he 
removed himself from them by taking on the role of recording secretary 
for the martyred, authoritatively dead Socrates” (9). Plato, he notes, is 
                                                
9 To be sure, I am not calling for textual presence in the sense of an “authorial voice” or 
“personal style.” The individualistic and modernist assumptions attendant to these 
expressivist ideals, I hold, ultimately contradict my feminist-sophistic stance. For a 
thoughtful consideration of the personal voice in scholarship, see Johanek, ch. 7. 
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utterly absent as an agent within the Phaedrus (15, 17), representing a 
written style and ethical posture intended to “Have us believe that no one 
is in control, that it is a disinterested movement toward truth set in 
operation and kept in motion by the power of dialectic as exercised by the 
superior philosopher, Socrates” (14). 
Plato’s absence/deferral of agency in the Phaedrus represents a 
historical precedent for our inherited academic and scientific writing 
styles—styles that likewise project a character of innocence and 
disinterestedness through the artful determination of voice and agency. 
Neel, like Sprague, identifies within such writing the machinations of 
power: 
Undeniably, Platonic writing has a powerful attraction. 
Those who embark on it can believe themselves to have 
superior souls, souls that wish to escape the limitations of 
the human condition. Merely embarking on the never-to-
be-completed journey toward truth sets these people apart 
as philosopher-kings who can revel in the satisfaction of 
knowing their love of wisdom should place them in roles of 
social authority. (97) 
By attempting to give up the passive, disinterested voice of the Platonic 
writing style, I hope to shed any indications of a metaphysical orientation 
or any aspirations to the superior status of a philosopher-king. 
This sophistic move potentially threatens my most immediate 
rhetorical goals: by taking this approach, I will give up the suasive power 
attendant to an objectivist, disembodied textual voice. Whatever rhetorical 
power my argument can be said to have, then, will remain a closer function 
of the ethos I actively work to develop in this study, rather than the ethos I 
work to disguise. As I hope to show in the course of this study, this 
apparently weaker role not only represents a more ethical and accountable 
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means of knowledge production, but it can also represent a persuasive, 
reliable, and ultimately truthful account of our shared experience. While 
using the active voice and the first person are admittedly minor 
grammatical moves, I believe their ethical, epistemic, and rhetorical 
consequences are appreciable. 
Remaining Grounded in a Practical Disciplinary Context 
Second, I attempt to couch the results of this study not as universal 
truths, but as paths for moving forward in the conversation of a 
discipline—specifically the discipline of technical communication. As I 
alluded to in my introduction, Mailloux and other scholars have argued 
that there is a notable complementarity between sophism and pragmatist 
philosophy (Rhetoric). Pragmatism holds that 
the whole “meaning” of a conception expresses itself in 
practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of 
conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be 
expected, if the conception be true; which consequences 
would be different if it were untrue, and must be different 
from the consequences by which the meaning of other 
conceptions is in turn expressed. (William James, qtd. in 
Mailloux, Rhetoric 4) 
Contrary to a Platonic stance holding that the pursuit of knowledge is its 
own reward and that the discovery of knowledge is its own justification, 
pragmatism asserts that the very notions of knowledge and theory are 
always already circumscribed and determined by their practical application. 
Rather than aspiring to the status of transcendent and eternal truth, 
knowledge and theory instead find their significance only when articulated 
against specific problems within specific contexts. 
Like pragmatism, a sophistic epistemology is concerned with the 
practical effects of the knowledge it produces. As Michael C. Leff notes in 
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his 1987 chapter “Modern Sophistic and the Unity of Rhetoric,” 
“Sophistic implies a pluralism in which methods of inquiry and argument 
are adapted to the particular subject under investigation. It seeks to solve 
situated problems rather than to formulate abstract theoretical principles” 
(24). He goes on to note that 
The philosophy of action advocated by both the ancient 
and modern sophists has little meaning until it engages 
specific activities. Sophistic is a field-dependent approach 
that relies on concrete [as opposed to abstract] models. 
Thus, the coherence of the program requires the generation 
of a model that encompasses the unity of form and content, 
of perspective and action, in respect to some domain of 
practice. (24) 
The study I am composing, then, should not be seen as engaging in the 
production of abstract, theoretical knowledge for knowledge’s sake. Rather, 
this study emerges from specific scholarly conversations arising within the 
context of the North American, postmillennial, academic field of technical 
communication. It seeks only to meet the practical needs of that field and 
to solve a finite number of problems relevant to its members. Far from a 
contemplative, disinterested search for a universal or totalizing Truth, this 
study self-consciously emerges from—and is intended to speak to—the 
practices of this specific scholarly community. 
In a similar fashion, feminist critiques of science also serve to draw 
our attention to the practical ends of research and knowledge making. As 
Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter note in the introduction to their 1993 
collection Feminist Epistemologies, feminist scholarship first emerged in 
practical, “applied” academic fields such as applied ethics. As they note, it 
is no coincidence that these fields 
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were and are viewed by most professional philosophers as 
“on the periphery” of central philosophical work, where the 
virtue of centrality is accorded to work with a greater 
degree of abstraction from concrete material reality and 
with pretensions to universality. Feminist philosophers 
began work in the applied areas because feminism is, first 
and last, a political movement concerned with practical 
issues, and feminist philosophers understood their 
intellectual work to be a contribution to the public debate 
on crucial practical issues. (2) 
Reflecting their own political origins, then, many feminist projects eschew 
the conception of epistemology as idle abstraction in favor of its 
conception as active, practical engagement. 
In their article “Are ‘Old Wives’ Tales’ Justified?” Vrinda Dalmiya 
and Linda Alcoff offer a vivid illustration of the dangers of separating the 
act of knowledge production from its practical ends. Here they relate the 
historical example of midwifery’s displacement by medical obstetrics, 
which had disastrous effects on quality of care for women: 
In Europe, when physicians were finally able to wrest 
obstetrics from the monopoly of the midwife, the result was 
an epidemic of death for the mothers. The cause was 
puerperal, or “childbed,” fever, which afflicted women by 
the thousands across European cities in the nineteenth 
century. This fever was produced by the unclean hands of 
the birth attendant, and although midwives at the time 
were just as ignorant as physicians about the bacterial 
sources of diseases, they had the advantage over physicians 
in that they saw no other patients and were unlikely to 
carry germs from dying patients to the absorptive tissues of 
the open womb. (222–23) 
The significance of this story, Dalmiya and Alcoff note, is that the 
epistemic and professional success of obstetrics was in no way predicated 
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on its practical success—it held no instrumental advantage over midwifery. 
Rather, obstetrics’ success was held in delegitimizing the practical, 
noncodifiable knowledges of the midwife, and by extension, delegitimizing 
their profession. It was, as Dalmiya and Alcoff note, simply a “triumph of 
propositional knowledge over practical knowledge” (223). 
This historical example demonstrates how traditional 
epistemologies can serve to render invisible other valid and successful 
practical knowledges. It demonstrates that the preoccupation with 
disengagement and abstraction found in Western scientific epistemologies 
carries with it clear moral and ethical consequences. And it cautions 
researchers against separating the creation of knowledge from the practical 
ends of that knowledge. As Dalmiya and Alcoff note: 
Knowing is not necessarily a matter of saying and 
representing what is the case but can also be a kind of 
practical involvement with the world. So the short and 
direct route of justifying the cognitive import of knowing 
how is to simply take the bull by the horns and deny the 
watertight distinction between the pragmatic and the 
epistemic. (235) 
In composing this study rhetorically, I attempt to remain mindful of this 
conception of knowing, as well as the consequences of ignoring the 
practical roots of knowledge claims. The pragmatic orientation common to 
both feminist theory and neosophism informs this study by cautioning me 
to remain attentive to the specific audiences and contexts that I intend this 
study to speak to, and the specific problems that I intend for it to address. 
So rather than articulating the findings of this study as revealed universal 
truths or transcendent theories, I hope the rhetoric of this study will 
instead reflect humbler aims: to help administrators, scholars, and teachers 
in the field of technical communication better understand baccalaureate 
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and certificate programs and to help them achieve practical ends within 
their own contexts (such as making decisions about the programs they 
administer, marshaling arguments for material support, benchmarking 
their programs, etc.). 
Remaining Aware of the Inherent Rhetoricity of Scholarship 
Finally, I try to remain self-consciously aware of the fact that this 
study, like all studies, is thoroughly rhetorical. In his 1966 article “On 
Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic,” Robert L. Scott argues that rhetoric is 
more than simply “a matter of giving effectiveness to truth,” but rather of 
actually “creating truth” (135). By suggesting the possibility of an 
epistemic role to rhetoric, Scott’s article went on to spark an extensive 
awakening to the role of rhetoric in the human sciences, and launched 
what is known as the “rhetoric of science” movement. This body of 
scholarship emerged from speech communication during the 1970s 
(Mailloux, Disciplinary 26), but draws on voices from a number of 
disciplines to describe the persuasive functioning of scientific research and 
academic scholarship (Kinneavy 197–8). 
As Herbert W. Simons notes in his 1990 introduction to The 
Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry, it isn’t 
just “that scientific discourse is inherently rhetorical at the point of 
paradigm clash” (8)—that is, the point at which new theories must gain 
sufficient assent to displace older, disproven theories. Rather, 
Broadly speaking, virtually all scholarly discourse is 
rhetorical in the sense that issues need to be named and 
framed, facts interpreted and conclusions justified; 
furthermore in adapting arguments to ends, audiences, and 
circumstances, the writer (or speaker) must adopt a persona, 
choose a style, and make judicious use of what Kenneth 
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Burke has called the “resources of ambiguity” in language. 
(9) 
Following this central premise of the rhetoric of science movement, the 
present study can only claim to be what all scholarship is: a rhetorical act. 
This study cannot claim to articulate universal truth; its persuasive effect 
very much depends on the rhetorical variables of audience, context, kairos, 
and to prepon. This study also cannot claim to be equally persuasive to all 
audiences; I do not presume that those who remain unpersuaded by the 
logic of this study (as, say, an articulation of universal reason) are defective. 
Instead, this study only claims to be a concerted attempt to coalesce my 
own disparate observations, and the observations of others, into an account 
that is persuasive to a specific scholarly audience in the field of technical 
communication. 
By asserting the inherent rhetoricity of this study, I don’t mean to 
suggest that it’s only “mere” rhetoric—I don’t, in other words, hold that 
this study is just a load of opportunistic, untethered blather. Rather, in 
asserting the rhetoricity of this work, I believe I also assert its fundamental 
connections to an audience and—socially constructed as they may be—the 
standards that audience holds for what constitutes a persuasive claim. 
Asserting the rhetoricity of this work in no way constitutes license to 
arbitrarily write my own epistemic and scholarly conventions; rather, it is a 
reminder that I defy existing conventions only at my own rhetorical peril. I 
believe this approach to be both rigorous and ethical. 
Although by foregrounding this work’s status as rhetoric I open 
myself up to the charge that I’m unconcerned with methodological rigor, I 
believe that this is not the case. By abandoning the powerfully suasive god-
tricks of a disembodied scholarly ethos, I believe that I am compelled to 
state my case even more explicitly than I would be otherwise. That is, 
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rather than relying on the god-trick to present an infallible account of the 
“real world,” my accounts must instead be couched solely in terms of my, 
and my audience’s, justifications for knowing. At no time can I defer the 
proclamation of knowledge to an invisible, textual deity. My “presence” as 
a fallible researcher in the text of this study, I believe, actually encourages 
more rigor, since it invites my audience to doubt me and my accounts in a 
way that the god-trick does not. 
Likewise, by foregrounding this work’s status as rhetoric, I open 
myself up to the millennia-old charge that I’m unconcerned with ethics. 
That is, if this study is “nothing more than” rhetoric, surely I as the rhetor 
must be concerned with “nothing more than” winning assent at any cost. 
However, my desire to succeed rhetorically within the specific, socially 
situated agon that this study speaks to compels me toward ethical action: it 
compels me to articulate my argument in terms of the values held by my 
audience. As Jarratt notes, the etymology of the word “ethics” reminds us 
of their connection to the social: “ethics,” she notes “are inseparable from 
ethe, a word meaning ‘haunts,’ or, even more colloquially, ‘hang outs’ and by 
extension ‘habits’ or ‘practices.’” (Rereading 96). What constitutes the 
standard of ethical action for this study, then, are the values common to 
the “haunt” that I inhabit and speak to: in this case, a community of 
careful, committed, and critical scholars in the academic field of technical 
communication. 
This audience would rightfully be alarmed—and would ultimately 
discount my arguments—if, say,  
• I showed no evidence of obtaining Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) oversight for my research;  
• if my survey didn’t live up to the commonly accepted 
standards of research design;  
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• if I presented hasty, illogical, or irresponsible conclusions 
from the data I develop;  
• if I demonstrated significant conflicts of interest; or  
• if I committed any one of countless other ethical-
methodological transgressions determined by the discursive 
community of academic technical communication. 
 I want to be absolutely clear, however, that my concern with the values of 
this community are not just instrumental: I don’t follow these ethical 
guidelines simply because I stand to win or lose a particular argument, or 
because I stand to craft a persuasive claim or not. I am concerned with 
these values because, as a member of the discursive community of 
academic technical communication myself, they are my values as well. As 
Jarratt’s etymology reminds us, what I describe above aren’t simply ethos 
problems—they are substantial ethics problems. 
Although the relativist ethical stance I am describing can seem 
terrifying to staunch foundationalists (see Harris), I, for one, take comfort 
knowing that the values I speak from (and to) are shared, and not the 
product of a pernicious solipsism. As R. Scott reminds us, the alternative 
to a socially oriented stance is dangerous: “The man [sic] who views 
himself as the instrument of the state, or of history, or of certain truth of 
any sort puts himself beyond ethical demands, for he says, in effect, ‘It is 
not I who am responsible’” (“On Viewing” 137). It bears pointing out that 
the stance Scott characterizes here is, in essence, the god-trick. 
Contrasting such a stance, he notes, “one who acts without certainty must 
embrace the responsibility for making his acts the best possible” (137). It is 
this very sort of accountability that the feminist-sophistic method in this 
study aspires to. 
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Finally, by asserting the rhetoricity of this work, I believe that I also 
assert the collective role we play in the social construction of our ethics. In 
other words, by foregrounding the epistemic function of persuasion in this 
study (rather than using the god-trick to obscure it), I believe I also draw 
attention to how we collectively maintain (or as necessary, resist and revise) 
what we count as persuasive—that is, what we decide to value. To Scott, 
this sort of collective participation is vital: “Inaction, failure to take on the 
burden of participating in the development of contingent truth, ought to 
be considered ethical failure” (16). Following this, it is my contention, and 
the contention of many feminist and neosophistic voices, that the time has 
come to resist and revise certain aspects of our received scientific and 
academic methods. As a necessary first step toward such revision, I argue, 
we must foreground the mutability and rhetoricity of our methods. 
In this chapter, I have sketched a number of pathways for 
rhetorically enacting a feminist-sophistic method. Admittedly, they 
represent only small starts toward the end of realizing a more embodied, 
situated, and ultimately ethical epistemology; my shifts in written style 
and rhetorical and ethical posture do not, in their sum, represent an 
entirely radical overhaul of our received methods of knowledge production. 
In fact, I suspect that the chapters that follow may come across as more 
evolutionary than revolutionary. But as Elizabeth Fee notes, simply 
imagining—let alone realizing—a wholly feminist epistemology may be 
impossible in the current androcentric paradigm: 
For us to imagine a feminist science in a feminist society is 
rather like asking a medieval peasant to imagine the theory 
of genetics or the production of a space capsule; our images 
are, at best, likely to be sketchy and unsubstantial. (qtd. in 
Harding, Science 138) 
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Still, I believe that the attempts I have made to enact a feminist-sophistic 
method in this study draw critical attention toward the rhetorical 
techniques common to traditional scientific and academic research. These 
subtle shifts serve as a reminder of the rhetoricity, social constructedness, 
situatedness, and partiality of all knowledge claims. And ultimately, I 
maintain, these shifts work against the god-trick as an entrenched 
rhetorical feature of our received epistemologies. 
In the next chapter, I turn away from method in terms of rhetorical 
enactment toward method in the more traditional terms of performing the 
research. I discuss in detail how I determined my survey sample and how I 
executed the survey itself. It is, admittedly, a less ruminative and self-
introspective chapter than the present one. However, in it I continue to 
employ—as I have striven to throughout this study—the rhetorical 
strategies that I believe characterize a feminist-sophistic method. 
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Chapter 4: 
Method for Surveying United States Baccalaureate and 
Certificate Programs in Technical Communication 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed my strategies for enacting a 
feminist-sophistic method in terms of the rhetorical stance I adopt as a 
researcher. In this chapter, I discuss my method in (the perhaps more 
traditional) terms of how I executed the research. My first step in this 
process was to seek approval for this study from Michigan Technological 
University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). On 1 February 2008 was 
granted approval and exemption from further IRB review under protocol 
#M0291. From there, I turned to the survey itself. Because the survey was 
to be mailed, I elected to restrict the sample to programs in the United 
States for reasons of cost. And because the original call from the CPTSC 
was for research into academic programs, I also elected to restrict the 
sample to academic programs alone. With these basic parameters 
established, I then set about determining the survey sample and 
composing and executing the survey itself. I discuss each of these 
procedures in detail in the remainder of the chapter. 
Determining the Sample 
Previous studies of technical communication academic programs 
take a number of varied approaches to determining their samples. In his 
1995 work “Assumptions about Technical Communication Programs” 
appearing in the proceedings of the STC, Kenneth T. Rainey surveys a 
“representative sample of 50 schools” selected from the 140 programs “that 
we know about” (40). His survey method remains largely unarticulated, 
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however: Rainey makes no mention of how the 140 programs were 
identified or how the 50 surveyed programs were chosen, and he provides 
no elaboration on his claim to the representativeness of the sample. 
In his 2001 National Communication Association presentation, “A 
Curricular Profile of United States Technical Communication 
Departments at the Beginning of the 21st Century,” Earl McDowell 
draws his sample of programs from the STC Academic Programs database 
(then at <http://www.stc-va.org/scripts.school>). McDowell attempts to 
visit the websites of 100 of the 148 baccalaureate programs in technical 
communication found in the database, and he is able to find “significant 
information” online for the curricula for 60 of those programs (16 
community colleges and 44 four-year institutions) (7). It is not clear, 
however, how McDowell selected his sample 100 programs from the 
initial population of 148 programs. He does not provide criteria for which 
programs were excluded, why programs were excluded, or if the selection 
of excluded programs was systematic. He also provides no discussion of 
how limiting his study to those programs with curriculum information 
available online might affect the results (i.e. selection bias). 
In my 2003 study of certificate programs in technical 
communication (“Looking”), I also rely on the STC database (then at 
<http://www.stc.org/academicDatabase.asp>) as the source for my sample. 
Unlike McDowell, however, I place a number of qualifications on which 
programs I survey. I include in my study those programs from the STC 
database meeting all of the following criteria: 
• The certificate program is expressly in “technical 
communication” or “technical writing”; 
• The certificate is an independent degree, and is not required to 
be earned concurrently with another degree as a minor would 
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be (however, programs can prerequire a degree for admission to 
the program); 
• Sufficient information is available online to determine the 
program’s curriculum and course requirements; and 
• The program information is available in English and courses 
are taught in English. 
Applying these criteria, I exclude 60 of the 122 initial programs listed in 
the STC database: 6 for being duplicates of other records in the database, 
32 for being misidentified as certificate programs or offering no 
identifiable certificate program in technical communication, 9 for 
requiring a concurrent degree (specifically, a bachelor’s degree), 9 for not 
having sufficient program information available online, and 4 for being 
offered in a foreign language. Although I express my belief that these 
exclusions do not “significantly impair the usefulness of the data,” I do 
speculate on how my sample selection could introduce some bias: 
By excluding nine programs for not having sufficient 
information online, for instance, I may have encouraged an 
overrepresentation of digital technology courses, as the lack 
of sufficient web presence at those institutions may 
conceivably also reflect the lack of major technology 
initiatives, training, or funding. In addition, by limiting the 
study to independent certificate programs (which do not 
require a concurrent degree), I may have also encouraged a 
small overrepresentation of industry-connected programs in 
the surveys […] Such programs, lacking the “captive 
audience” of an undergraduate student body, may have a 
greater incentive to recruit students and feedback from local 
industry. 
In their 2004 study “TPC Program Snapshots: Developing 
Curricula and Addressing Challenges,” Nancy Allen and Steven T. 
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Benninghoff take a slightly different approach to selecting their sample. 
They actively, if unsystematically, augment a program directory maintained 
by the Association for Teachers of Technical Writing (ATTW) with “other 
schools whose faculty members are frequent contributors to discussion of 
program issues on ATTW-L (ATTW email-discussion list)” (160). They 
don’t specify which programs came from which source, but in all they 
indentify 73 baccalaureate programs for participation in their survey. 
Regarding the representativeness of this sample, they acknowledge that 
“Although the list of participating schools includes only a slice of all the 
programs in the county, it represents a broad range of large and small 
schools spanning the Carnegie Corporation’s categories from 
baccalaureate/associate’s colleges to doctoral/research universities—
extensive” (160). 
And in their 2005 study, Sandi Harner and Anne Rich rely on the 
STC Academic Programs Database (then at <http://www.stc.org/ 
academicDatabase.asp>) to determine the programs in their sample. Using 
a method much like McDowell’s and Nugent’s, of the 133 baccalaureate 
programs they find in the STC database, they examine the online curricula 
for 80 programs across 75 different institutions (210). Like McDowell, 
Harner and Rich do not discuss how and why programs were excluded 
from their sample. But they make an notable move to foreground some of 
their assumptions about the types of programs in their sample: 
The introduction to the STC database states, “To assist 
those interested in pursuing a career in technical 
communication, STC provides a database of academic 
programs worldwide. Schools are welcome to add their 
programs to the database.” So we assume that if a program 
director has entered information, the goal of that program 
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is to prepare students “interested in pursuing a career in 
technical communication.” (210) 
Most of these studies on academic programs draw at least some 
portion of their sample from a major program directory, and in doing so, 
make assumptions (whether articulated or not) about the completeness 
and representativeness of those directories. Each study also makes 
assumptions about “what counts” as a program for the purposes of their 
research, and assumes that the programs that “count” are represented in 
their samples. These assumptions, and the diverse methods these studies 
ultimately employ, demonstrate just how challenging sample 
determination is for research on academic programs in technical 
communication. As I identify, determining the sample breaks down into 
two corollary problems: 
1. finding what programs are in existence, and 
2. determining meaningful criteria for which programs to 
survey. 
In the following sections, I discuss how I address both of these problems 
in the present research. 
Finding What Programs are in Existence 
Beginning with the first problem, despite previous studies’ reliance 
on program directories, no complete and authoritative list of programs in 
technical communication can be said to exist, making it difficult to initiate 
systematic research of technical communication programs. While 
independent directories of academic and commercial programs in 
technical communication are maintained by each the STC, the CPTSC, and 
the ATTW, a close examination of their contents reveals notable gaps and 
oversights: a number of programs appear in one directory but not the 
others; some programs are absent entirely from the directories; and, as I 
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came to find, programs offering certificates are notably underrepresented 
across all three directories. 
The STC Academic Programs database (available at <http:// 
www.stc.org/academic>) has been hosted by the society since at least the 
year 2001 (DuBay). However, the database contents are not maintained by 
any central authority. Rather, all of the information in the database is self-
reported, and is frequently incomplete or inaccurate (see Latterell 323). In 
response to efforts to improve the quality of the directory, the STC 
Academic Programs Database underwent “major changes” in 2007, 
including the deletion of a significant number of records. A call was 
circulated that year for programs to re-enter their data using a new 
database web interface (Henschel), which led to a reduction in the number 
of listed programs. For instance, in 2005 the STC database reported 133 
baccalaureate programs in technical communication (Harner and Rich 
210), but in March 2008 the database reported only 65 such programs. 
While the STC Academic Programs database is one of the largest and most 
complete technical communication program directories—not to mention 
an invaluable resource to the field—it is by no means complete, 
comprehensive, and stable. 
To generate a more comprehensive sample source for this study, I 
set about creating my own directory of United States programs in 
technical communication at all levels (certificates, baccalaureates, 
baccalaureate concentrations, minors, associates, masters, and doctorates). 
To provide a starting point, I first aggregated the contents of the existing 
program directories into one database. On 9 March 2008, I visited the 
websites of the STC, CPTSC, and ATTW directories, and—through a 
monotonous routine of “copy/paste” from my web browser—I pulled 
program information appearing in them into a single Microsoft Access 
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database. I first copied all 100 entries for United States academic programs 
from the STC Academic Programs Database. I then turned to the CPTSC 
Program List, first created in September 2007 (Bridgeford, “CPTSC”) and 
available at <http://www.cptsc.org/proglist>. Of the 64 total entries in the 
CPTSC Program List, I found and copied into my database 21 entries for 
United States academic programs not already appearing in the STC 
Academic Programs Database. Finally, of the 77 total entries appearing in 
the ATTW programs directory (available at <http://cms.english.ttu.edu/ 
attw/programs>), I found and copied into my database 13 entries for 
United States programs not appearing in either the STC Academic 
Programs Database or the CPTSC Program List. This yielded an 
aggregated directory of 134 unique technical communication programs—
34 programs (34%) more than found in the STC Academic Programs 
Database alone. 
However, after performing a few subsequent, informal web 
searches, I identified webpages for additional programs not appearing in 
any of the three major program directories. In attempt to correct such 
omissions, I systematically searched the web for overlooked technical 
writing and technical communication programs. Over the course of 9–14 
March 2008, I performed web searches using Google (at <http:// 
www.google.com>), querying in order—and without quotation marks—
the following phrases: 
1. technical writing program, 
2. technical communication program, 
3. technical communication certificate, and 
4. technical writing certificate. 
Reading each of the top 600 results for each of these queries, I recorded 
every program I came across that met all of these criteria: 
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• it was an academic program offered in the United States; 
• it did not already appear in my aggregated programs database; 
• it offered a certificate, baccalaureate degree, or graduate degree 
expressly in technical communication, technical writing, 
professional communication, or professional writing; 
• it did not already appear in my previous search results. 
The four queries listed above yielded, in sequence, 11, 9, 12, and 6 
additional programs meeting these criteria. Adding these programs to my 
aggregated program database yielded a comprehensive directory of 172 
United States technical communication programs—72 programs (72%) 
more than the STC Academic Programs Database alone and 38 programs 
(28%) more than the major three directories combined. Although it is 
obviously impossible to verify if every U.S. technical communication 
program is contained in this directory, I believe that it represents a more 
comprehensive sample source for program research than any other 
currently available. 
I also turned to the web to insure the completeness of program 
data within the comprehensive directory. The types of data recorded in the 
STC, CPTSC, and ATTW directories vary considerably. In the case of the 
STC Academic Programs Database, the information available include the 
name of the institution; the official names and types of programs offered; 
the name, email address, mailing address, and phone number of a contact 
person; and the URL of the program webpage. The information I gathered 
from the CPTSC Program List varies by each program entry, but all entries 
provide at least the name of the institution and the URL of the program 
webpage. Some entries also provide the official name of the program and 
the name and email address of a contact person. The information available 
from the ATTW programs directory is limited strictly the name of the 
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institution and the URL of the program webpage. Regardless of the source 
of the information, however—whether it was the STC, CPTSC, or ATTW 
directories, or whether it was from a web search—I amended as necessary 
each of the 172 entries in the comprehensive database to include all of the 
following data: 
• the name of the institution; 
• the name of the department; 
• the names and types of degrees offered; 
• the URL of the program webpage; and 
• information for a contact person or department head, including 
o name, 
o mailing address, 
o email address (when available), and 
o phone number (when available). 
I gathered these additional data during 9–14 March 2008 by visiting 
program webpages, navigating university websites, and by performing 
Google web searches as needed. The names and addresses of programs 
contained in the comprehensive program directory appear in Appendix A. 
Through the process of aggregating and examining existing 
program directories, and later by systematically searching the web for 
overlooked programs, I was not only able to develop a more 
comprehensive database of United States technical communication 
programs to use as the sample for the present survey, but I was also able to 
reveal a number of oversights in our current accounting of programs. As I 
found, programs offering a certificate are disproportionately 
underrepresented in the three major program directories. Of the 134 total 
U.S. technical communication programs listed in the combined major 
program directories, 56 (41%) offer a certificate. Of the 38 additional 
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programs that I found through Google web searches, 33 (86%) offer a 
certificate. That is, programs excluded from the three major program 
directories are more than twice as likely to offer a certificate than those 
that were included. Correcting this underrepresentation is, of course, 
particularly important in light of the present research. 
Determining Which Programs to Study 
The second major challenge for program research is determining 
criteria for which programs to survey. Since, as I found, the major program 
directories are inadequate sample sources for this study, I had to augment 
them with web research to create a more comprehensive program list. In 
compiling this list, I was immediately faced with an important (if fraught) 
methodological question: what exactly defines a program in “technical 
communication”? What set of criteria can I apply to a given program to 
systematically determine whether it actually “counts” as a technical 
communication program? As I develop the directory through web 
searches, what terms do I use for the queries? For instance, on top of 
querying “technical communication program,” “technical writing 
program,” “technical communication certificate,” and “technical writing 
certificate,” should I also query the phrases “professional writing program” 
and “professional writing certificate”? Are technical communication/ 
writing programs the same as professional communication/writing 
programs, or are they essentially different? 
To many teachers and scholars in the field of technical 
communication—where the prefixes “technical,” “professional,” or even 
“business” are frequently conflated—this last question may seem moot. As 
reflected in the titles of the field’s most prominent scholarly journals, we’re 
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apparently comfortable with a wide range of descriptors for “what we do” 
in technical communication: 
• Journal of Technical Writing and Communication, 
• Journal of Technical and Business Communication, 
• Business Communication Quarterly, 
• Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Transactions 
on Professional Communication, 
• Technical Communication, and 
• Technical Communication Quarterly. 
And as I found, of the 139 programs listed in the STC, CPTSC, and ATTW 
directories combined—that is, programs that have self-identified as 
technical communication/writing programs—60 (43%) offer at least one 
program (certificate, baccalaureate, baccalaureate concentration, minor, 
associates, masters, or doctorate) containing the word “professional,” such 
as professional writing, professional communication, public and 
professional writing, etc. At least superficially, it seems, the distinction 
between “technical” and “professional” is not immediately apparent. 
In fact, many “professional” writing/communication programs 
prove on close examination to be indistinguishable from programs 
expressly in technical communication. However a significant number of 
such programs also prove themselves to be substantively afield. For 
instance, in performing a Google web query for “professional writing 
program” in August 2008, the first listed result is for the website of The 
University of Maryland’s Professional Writing Program (PWP). According 
to their website, 
The program offers courses in Science Writing (English 
390), Argumentation/Advanced Composition (English 
391), Legal Writing (English 392), Technical Writing 
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(English 393), Business Writing (English 394), and 
Writing for the Health Professions (English 395), and 
Special Topics in Professional Writing (English 398). For 
each of these Professional Writing courses, syllabi are 
designed to permit and foster growth in rhetorical and 
language skills: 
• students will become more aware of the ethos 
they project, and more adept at defining and 
analyzing audiences. 
• students will learn how to research topics in the 
“real world” and will engage in research; all PWP 
courses entail a significant research component. 
• students will learn to plan their work according 
to audience and purpose. 
• students will learn when and how to reveal their 
rhetorical plan to facilitate readability. 
• students will write in a style suitable to 
audience and occasion. 
• students will participate in draft workshop 
sessions, allowing groups of students to test their 
claims, and to engage in the sort of dialogue that 
joins an expert in one field with an expert in 
another. 
• students will be prepared for writing, 
communication, and research beyond the classroom. 
(“PWP’s Program”) 
The emphases here on audience, purpose, ethos, process, and real-world 
contexts reflects the rhetorical orientation of the PWP curriculum: an 
orientation consistent with the current best practices in technical 
communication pedagogy. By those measures—even with the program’s 
“professional writing” moniker—I think few educators or scholars in the 
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field would find significant differences between it and a majority of other 
programs expressly in technical communication. Nor do I believe they 
would they hesitate to declare the PWP curriculum an adequate 
professional preparation for a technical communicator. 
In marked contrast, however, is the second listed result from the 
same Google web query: the University of Southern California (USC) 
Master of Professional Writing program (“Master”). The program boasts 
“An interdisciplinary approach uniting five disciplines: fiction, creative 
non-fiction, poetry, screenwriting, and playwriting.” The website also touts 
the program’s “Proximity to Los Angeles’ entertainment and literary 
industries.” While USC’s program, like Maryland’s PWP, is expressly in 
“professional writing,” I think few educators or scholars in the field would 
recognize it as a “technical communication” or even “technical 
communication-related” program. And given USC’s apparent goal of 
preparing writers for the entertainment and literary professions, I think 
even fewer would agree that the program represents adequate professional 
preparation for a technical communicator. (They might, however, find 
some amusement in the program’s particular use of the word 
“interdisciplinary.”) 
These examples demonstrate that the common belief that 
“professional” and “technical” are interchangeable does not always hold. In 
fact, in my examination of the 98 subsequent results from the same web 
search, I found that 7 of the 10 new programs I came across (that is, the 
programs not already listed in my comprehensive program directory) 
appeared to offer more preparation in creative, literary, or dramatic writing 
than in technical, scientific, non-fiction, or workplace communication—a 
pattern I did not witness in my search for “technical writing” and 
“technical communication” programs/certificates. This is, of course, a 
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casual and unsystematic interpretation of these programs’ offerings, and 
given the intractable challenges of methodically quantifying or qualifying 
these “outlier” programs, I don’t intend to represent these as anything 
more than anecdotal findings. However, they seem to suggest that 
differences between expressly “professional” programs and expressly 
“technical” programs are more substantive than frequently acknowledged. 
Rather kairotically, a discussion arose on the ATTW listserv in April 
2008 about this very issue. While the discussion is wide-ranging and 
illuminating, the respondents—who include notable scholars in the field of 
technical communication—are far from unanimous in their stance or 
approach to the issue. Most contributors to this conversation seem to 
agree, however, that “professional” and “technical” communication/writing 
are not identical. The discussion begins with a request from Thomas Orr: 
“Could someone point me to some generally-agreed-upon definitions of 
“professional communication” and “technical communication” that clarify 
the differences between the two?” By the following day, this request had 
elicited 13 responses. 
Brenton Faber is the first to reply, and discusses some of the 
implications of the debate for the project of professionalizing the field. He 
suggests that, “Other than for reasons of efficiency (which is generally not 
a quality of professional work) or exigence (again....) we have little actual 
theoretical or emprical [sic] support for combining professional and 
technical the way we usually do.” Daniel Tripp seconds Faber’s assertion 
that professional and technical are not synonymous: 
While searching through job ads over the past two years, I 
have noticed a lot of variances in what English 
department’s consider to be “professional writing.” For 
some, it means technical writing, business writing, etc. 
Others consider it to be creative non-fiction, freelance 
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writing, etc. Some even seem to mean journalism or public 
relations/marketing. 
Meanwhile, other respondents take a stab at providing firm 
distinctions between technical and professional. Stephen A. Bernhardt 
offers a very succinct definition: 
I use professional to include a broader reach than technical, 
which tends to include engineering, computer science, 
agriculture. Professional includes the broad classes of 
college educated workers. There is also the meaning of 
“professional schools,” such as law, medicine, pharmacy, etc. 
(“Reminder”) 
Peter England, offers a definition by way of hearsay: 
I heard someone outside our field make an excellent 
argument distinguishing professional from technical 
communication. She said that technical communication is 
distinguished by the level of detailed knowledge. 
Professional communication could be something shared by 
human resources, engineers, lawyers, nurses, etc. 
Professional communication is the thing we do to make our 
jobs work. Technical communication, however, is something 
we do to make our specific jobs work—communicating 
something about your individual field. In this sense, 
“technical” means specialized or detailed. 
Thomas Barker concedes his doubt that “accepted scholarly distinctions 
exist” between technical and professional, but he goes on to relate in detail 
a working list of distinctions between the two. The multiple points of 
difference he identifies concern mostly the context of professional practice. 
For instance, he describes technical communicators as “persons in .com 
organizations writing product use documents, marketing communication, 
help systems” while professional communicators are “lone writers in org or 
gov settings writing proposals, white papers, and policy.” And Susan L. 
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Popham takes a notably different tack by turning her critical attention not 
to the word “professional,” but to the word “technical.” She asks if we “can 
we come to an equally theoretical definition of ‘technical,’ something 
besides ‘writing in workplaces’ or ‘writing about technologized things’?” 
Several respondents turn to the context of local programs to 
explain the field’s loose terminology. Stuart Selber notes “I love the theory 
talk, but I think the different uses are more strategic than anything: people 
find language for their local context that allows them to claim a special 
campus expertise.” Rob Irish describes how our terminology might 
function strategically not only as a form of marketing to students, but also 
on behalf of a larger profession: 
Could it be that “professional” is a wish label to elevate our 
courses into the realm of desireable [sic] to students who are 
skeptical? Perhaps, the label is to persuade students that 
this course could lead to employment (unlike say, “creative 
writing” or “literature”). That is, this is for “college educated 
workers” who also want a job (or should I say, employment, 
or a profession—latinized euphemisms for good Old 
Engish [sic] work). This is not to say that we are misleading 
students, only that we are employing the power of language 
to simultaneously compose the profession and elevate its 
status. 
And Stephen A. Bernhardt likewise emphasizes a strategic function, 
noting that “sometimes terms are useful because loose. It is often useful to 
distinguish professionals who write from professional writers” 
(“Professional”). 
In all, the broad range (and tangential nature) of this discussion 
suggests that the question at its origin is a deceptively hard one to answer. 
Defining technical communication—even just in defining the ways it 
might stand distinct from “professional” writing or “professional” 
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communication—is a particularly thorny undertaking, as it necessarily 
touches on a number of lingering disciplinary, professional, and political 
issues. Calls to draw up lists of “core competencies,” to certify 
practitioners, and to professionalize the field are seemingly permanent 
features of technical communication scholarship and commentary (see 
Turner and Rainey; Savage, “Process”; Savage and Kynell-Hunt). Given 
the lack of consensus among researchers, practitioners, and teachers about 
what constitutes the ideal course of professional preparation for technical 
communicators, an axiomatic, universally held definition of a “technical 
communication program” is unlikely to emerge soon. In addition, as 
reported in in-depth curricular studies, technical communication curricula 
are wildly disparate at both the certificate and undergraduate levels. As far 
as we can tell, there is no such thing as a “core” or “standard” curriculum in 
technical communication (Nugent, “Looking”; Harner and Rich). So even 
efforts to empirically derive a working definition of a “technical 
communication program” are likely to be met with frustration. 
The question of defining our field will doubtlessly receive further 
study—not just in the form of program research but also in the form of 
debate about the more abstract issues of what “counts” professionally and 
disciplinarily as technical communication. While I return to this issue and 
offer some commentary of my own in the final chapter, I concede here that 
to definitively settle the questions surrounding the identity of technical 
communication lies well beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, my 
method requires that I provide at least provisional answers to these thorny 
questions, if only for the purpose of determining the survey sample. So, 
• given the deficiencies in the major program directories and the 
need to actively supplement them through web searches; 
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• given that a significant number of programs expressly in 
“professional writing” are clearly not intended to prepare 
students for careers in technical communication or related 
lines; 
• given the apparent consensus among teacher/scholars that 
meaningful differences do exist between “technical” and 
“professional” programs; 
• given the lack of consensus on what those differences might 
specifically be; and 
• given that examining individual program curricula to assess 
their status as a “technical communication” program or 
otherwise would be untenable—not only because such an 
undertaking would exceed the scope of the current study, but 
because it would also imply that established criteria exist for 
making such a determination—; 
I had to determine a systematic means of my own for identifying the 
relevant programs to survey. For this, I elected to rely on program names to 
determine their inclusion in this study. Specifically, I restricted my sample 
to programs in the comprehensive directory offering at least one 
baccalaureate degree, baccalaureate concentration, certificate, or graduate 
degree having the word “technical” in its title (such as “technical 
communication,” “technical writing,” “technical and business 
communication,” etc.). That is, “professional” degrees and certificates were 
excluded from my sample except in cases where the program also offered a 
“technical” degree or certificate. Of the 172 programs listed in the 
comprehensive directory of programs, 141 met this qualification. 
My final step in determining the sample was to restrict the survey 
only to those programs offering baccalaureates or certificates. That is, since 
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this study is intended to provide a comparison between baccalaureate and 
certificate programs, I did not want to survey programs offering only, say, 
an associate’s degree, an undergraduate minor, or graduate degrees. Of the 
141 remaining programs in my sample, 27 offered no apparent certificate, 
baccalaureate degree, concentration of any kind, leaving 114 programs in 
the final sample. These 114 programs comprising the sample are noted in 
Appendix A. 
The Survey Instrument 
With the sample selected, I then worked to compose and execute 
the survey. The survey instrument I composed is four pages long, contains 
14 questions, and asks questions soliciting 40 pieces of data about 
applicable certificate or baccalaureate programs (see appendix B for a 
facsimile of the survey). I estimated it would take a knowledgeable 
program administrator approximately 15 minutes to complete. On page 
one of the survey, I ask questions about the program’s institution: its status 
as public or private, its size, the department or academic unit containing 
the program, the types of professional or technical communication/writing 
degrees offered by the department or academic unit, and the types of 
degrees (of all kinds) offered by the department or academic unit. 
On page two of the survey, I ask questions about the program’s 
professional or technical communication/writing baccalaureate degree or 
baccalaureate concentration, if offered. The data I sought include: the year 
the program conferred its first baccalaureate, the current enrollment in the 
baccalaureate program, the number of degrees conferred in the 2006–2007 
academic year, the total number of degrees conferred in the lifetime of the 
program, the total number of courses required for program completion, the 
number of hours per week that courses in the baccalaureate program 
typically meet for, the number of weeks in a term of study, the number of 
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terms required for program completion, the portion of the degree that can 
be earned online, and whether an internship is required for program 
completion. 
On page three of the survey, I ask questions about the program’s 
professional or technical communication/writing certificate, if offered, and 
these questions parallel the questions appearing on page two. The data I 
sought include: the year the program conferred its first certificate, the 
current enrollment in the certificate program, the number of certificates 
conferred in the 2006–2007 academic year, the total number of certificates 
conferred in the lifetime of the program, the total number of courses 
required for program completion, the number of hours per week that 
courses in the certificate program typically meet for, the number of weeks 
in a term of study, the number of terms required for program completion, 
the portion of the certificates that can be earned online, and whether an 
internship is required for certificate completion. In addition, I asked 
whether enrollment in some other program (such as a baccalaureate 
program) was required for certificate enrollment. 
On page four of the survey, I ask questions about instructors in the 
department or academic unit housing the professional or technical 
communication/writing baccalaureate or certificate. The data I sought 
include: the total number of instructors teaching in the department or 
academic unit (including full-time, part-time, faculty, adjunct, and 
graduate students, regardless of their specialization); the number of 
graduate student teaching in the department or academic unit; the number 
of tenure-track instructors teaching in the department or academic unit; 
the number of instructors regularly teaching technical communication 
courses, the number of instructors regularly teaching technical 
communication courses holding a degree expressly in the disciplines of 
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• technical communication, 
• technical writing, 
• business writing, or 
• professional writing; 
the specializations of instructors regularly teaching technical 
communication courses that don’t hold the above-listed degrees; and, of 
instructors regularly teaching technical communication courses, the 
number that 
• have industry or professional experience, 
• hold a bachelor’s degree as their highest degree earned, 
• hold a master’s degree as their highest degree earned, 
• hold a doctorate as their highest degree earned, 
• are graduate students, and 
• hold tenure-track positions. 
After composing, laying out, and duplicating the survey, on 3 April 
2008 I mailed the survey to the 114 selected programs along with a cover 
letter explaining the research (see Appendix C for a facsimile of the letter) 
and a prepaid-postage return mailer. On 12 May 2008, I sent reminder 
postcards (reproduced in Appendix D) to the 80 programs who had not 
yet responded by that date. On 18 June 2008, I sent new duplicate surveys 
and cover letters (again with a prepaid-postage return mailer) to the 73 
programs who had not yet responded by that date. By 15 September 2008, 
I received a total of 59 completed surveys—a response rate of 52%. In the 
following chapter, I discuss the results and conclusions from these surveys, 
and I conclude this work by presenting some theorization of technical 
communication certificate programs most broadly. 
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Chapter 5: 
Results and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I present the results of this study in the form of 
descriptive statistics about technical communication certificate programs 
and I conclude by discussing what these results might signify, both 
practically and theoretically, for our understanding of certificates. But first, 
in keeping with the feminist-sophistic methodology I articulated in 
chapters 2 and 3, I make a brief, reflexive digression to resolve a few 
remaining methodological issues.  
Feminist-Sophistic Methodology and the “God-Trick” 
As I describe in chapter 3, in my attempt to enact a feminist-
sophistic methodology I eschew the “god-trick” in the rhetorical 
performance of this study. I describe three major rhetorical techniques I 
employ toward this end: remaining present in the text, remaining 
grounded in a practical disciplinary context, and remaining aware of the 
inherent rhetoricity of scholarship. So far I have attempted to remain 
present in the text both grammatically and ethically through my use of the 
active voice and personal pronouns. I have also attempted to remain 
grounded in a practical disciplinary context by identifying my audience 
and framing the study as a response to conversations within the academic 
field of technical communication. And I have attempted to self-
consciously foreground the rhetoricity of this work by identifying it as a 
persuasive act that I intend to accomplish a particular purpose, with a 
particular audience, within a particular context. 
According to the generic conventions of empirical research, 
however, this is the point in the study where—after the background, 
methodology, and methods have been displayed—the major findings are 
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revealed in the form of results and conclusions. At this point, I believe, I 
am faced most directly with the dilemma I discuss at the outset of chapter 
2: how do I make broad, persuasive claims about certificate programs 
nationwide while resisting the foundationalizing impulses of a traditional 
methodology? Convention holds that this portion of the study should 
focus almost exclusively on the “objects” of research and put forward 
broadly aggregative results and summative conclusions about those 
“objects.” Such results and conclusions are typically composed in the 
declarative mood with an almost godlike authorial voice, a rhetorical form 
that, like the passive voice, represents an evasion of grammatical and 
ethical agency. The god-trick, it would seem, looms large over this chapter, 
deeply encoded within the empirical research genre. 
 What alternative rhetorical form could this chapter take to remain 
consistent with a feminist-sophistic methodology? How can I present 
knowledge that actually claims to say something about certificate 
programs—knowledge with persuasive effect and distinct practical 
application, but without the pretense and stylistic artifice of objective 
Truth? One possible approach would be for me to use the sophistic 
rhetorical techniques of antithesis, parataxis, dissoi logoi, and paradoxologia 
to present multiple, differing—even contradictory—conclusions from the 
data I generate. Such an approach would counter the prevalent, 
foundationalist notions of non-contradiction and objectivity, and would 
work against the god-trick as a feature of the empirical research genre. 
However, this approach also presents its own unique problems. In its 
almost Derridian insistence that texts must necessarily work against 
themselves—even to the end of their own political incapacitation—this 
approach might also subvert the possibility for making practical meaning 
in the first place. Further, such an approach could serve to keep my 
positionality and mediate role as a rhetor-researcher obscured: the various 
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conclusions that I presented under such an approach, for instance, would 
still be of my own devising, finite in number, and persuasive in intent. 
Instead, I will take an approach that perhaps allows me to more 
productively address both sides of this “god-trick” dilemma. As I describe 
in chapter 2, a feminist-sophistic methodology retains a optimism toward 
the possibility of exercising political agency and making meaning. In that 
chapter I cite Haraway’s invocation of the coyote-trickster, a figure who 
“suggests our situation when we give up mastery but keep searching for 
fidelity, knowing all the while we will be hoodwinked” (Simians 199). I 
also cite Jasper Neel’s parallel commentary that, “In contrast to Derrida 
[…] the sophists allow themselves to be persuaded by an argument, while 
never forgetting the inadequate, deceitful foundation that enabled the 
argument” (207). Consistent with these critical, yet optimistic epistemic 
perspectives, I will assert the knowledge of this study in a direct and 
declarative rhetorical style largely consistent with the empirical research 
genre. However, in attempt to contravene the looming god-trick, I will also 
foreground some of the wily and deceptive strategies that undergird my 
claims to knowledge in this study. 
This approach is suggested by Scott Consigny’s characterization of 
Gorgias’ “parodic” style: a performative style in which the ancient rhetor 
deliberately draws attention to both the conventions and the rhetoricity of 
localized discourses. As Consigny describes, Gorgias’ use of this style is a 
reflection of his sophistic epistemology: 
by displaying the rhetoricity of every text, he shows his 
audience that all arguments, including his own, are 
contingent, situated fabrications that are “true” only insofar 
as they are endorsed by specific audiences. Gorgias’ 
objective is not to transmit objective truth or to inculcate 
universal moral principles, but to encourage people to 
become engaged in the agons of their culture. (Gorgias 30–
1) 
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By displaying the rhetoricity of the present text in a similar fashion, I 
believe that I both avoid the “Pyrrhonian skepticism” of deconstruction 
(Bizzell) and undermine the foundationalizing rhetorical ploys of 
traditional scientific scholarship.10 Toward both of these ends, I 
acknowledge the following as rhetorical strategies in my accounts of 
technical communication programs: 
• I use the declarative mood to lend a sense of certainty and 
unassailability to my claims. This linguistic feature serves 
rhetorically to obscure my agency as a rhetor-researcher, to 
erase the appearance of ambiguity from my knowledge claims, 
and to draw the audience’s attention away not only from my 
active role in the construction of this text, but also from the 
very notion that this text was constructed to begin with.  
• I am selective of what results and conclusions I present from 
this research. I don’t present the full range of possible 
outcomes and interpretations from this study. Rather, I compile 
a finite number of results and conclusions that I think are 
rhetorically feasible to assert and that I assume are significant. 
What counts as “feasible” or “significant,” of course, is 
                                                
10 For a contrasting perspective, see Michelle Ballif’s Seduction, Sophistry, and the Woman 
with the Rhetorical Figure (182–6). As a scholar closer to the deconstructive school than 
myself, I suspect that Ballif might fault the sort of middle-ground, or neopragmatic, 
stance that I describe here. To Ballif, such a stance “is not sophistic enough” (183) and 
serves “once again (in the name of antifoundationalism) to stabilize language” (182). Such 
a stance “emanates from a rhetorical subject who controls language who can chose to 
abuse it or not—or to abuse others via its power” (183). Although Ballif grants that such 
a position is “released from ontological foundations, metaphysical presumptions and 
truth,” it is nonetheless bound by its “dependence on techne,” and as such, “serves to 
maintain the boundaries and limits of a particular discourse and is motivated by the desire 
of the ‘we’ to colonize every ‘they.’” (183). 
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informed by my subject position and the particular audience(s), 
purpose(s), and context(s) that this study speaks to. 
• I structure my presentation of information with the intent to 
close off alternative interpretations. For instance, I often first 
present a summative statement or conclusion, followed by a 
recitation of the data from the study that I believe supports 
that conclusion (again, in the declarative mood). Ordering my 
argument in this way engages my audience enthymematically 
by encouraging them to think through the connections 
between the conclusion and the premises on their own. But 
stating the conclusion first can be seen as an attempt on my 
part to attain control over the audience’s likely interpretation of 
the data and to forestall the possibility of my audience arriving 
at alternative conclusions. 
• I use verb tense to perform a sort of “epistemic elision” 
between the particular and the general. This survey offers a 
snapshot of descriptive statistics about technical 
communication programs in the context of 2008. Despite the 
fact that the survey is situated in the past, however, the results 
and conclusions that follow are largely in the present tense. 
This works rhetorically to obscure the circumstantiality—and 
to affirm the universality—of my results and conclusions. As I 
explore in chapter 3, the artful use of verb tense in this way can 
give knowledge the seductive appearance of timelessness.  
• I rely on categories of my own construction to give suasive 
power to information. Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the results of 
sorting information into discrete categories. Although I was 
systematic in performing these categorizations, devising the 
categories themselves was an iterative and ad hoc process of 
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looking at the survey results and identifying areas of 
commonality and difference. This process was informed not 
only by my reading of similar research (for example, Harner 
and Rich) but also by my particular, situated understanding of 
disciplinary politics. Establishing discrete categories in this way 
(a rhetorical tactic that summons back to Aristotle) lends the 
appearance of priority and transcendence to intellectual 
constructs that are, at best, kairotic and heuristic. Alternative 
and equally meaningful categories are, of course, possible. 
• I use visual design to establish a sense of credibility. For 
instance, the tidy tables of data that follow bear no resemblance 
to the relatively casual Microsoft Excel spreadsheets that the 
data came from or even to the pile of handwritten surveys 
sitting on my desk. My careful and hygienic visual presentation 
of the data works to establish my ethos as a careful researcher. 
Similarly, the overall visual layout of these pages works to 
establish the ethos of a staid, scholarly monograph. My 
consistent use of only one serif font and the general absence of 
non-textual visual features in this document, for instance, are 
my attempts to tap into a long visual tradition of alphabetic-
centric scholarship.  
This isn’t, of course, a catalog of all the rhetorical strategies 
employed in this chapter, and these strategies certainly aren’t unique to the 
present study. But by foregrounding the rhetoricity of this work in such a 
self-reflexive and confessional way—even at the risk of ultimately reducing 
its suasive power—I hope to engage in the creation of positive, usable 
knowledge while still making apparent my mediate role as a rhetor-
researcher. My intent here is not to undermine this study, or, again, to 
reveal it as a load of opportunistic, untethered blather. Rather, by laying 
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bare some of the rhetorical machinations of this study, my intent is to draw 
attention to the rhetorical machinations—that is, the “trickery” and 
“deception”—at the heart of all knowledge claims. In this way, the more 
fully present and accountable “coyote tricks” of a feminist-sophistic 
epistemology come to replace the largely invisible and coercive “god-
tricks” of our received epistemologies. As I articulate in chapter 3, such a 
feminist-sophistic epistemology holds promise as both a more ethical and 
rigorous means of knowledge production. 
Results 
In preparing the data for analysis, I transcribed the 59 returned 
surveys into a Microsoft Access database. As I performed this 
transcription, I obeyed two conventions. First, I did not record the 
responses to questions left blank, answered “N/A,” or answered 
“unknown.” Second, when answering questions soliciting a numeric 
answer (such as the total number of instructors in a program), some 
respondents provided an estimated range instead of a single number. In 
these cases, I recorded the midpoint of the range. For instance, if a 
respondent answered “12–14,” I recorded “13.” After transcribing the 
surveys, I moved the data into an Excel spreadsheet for calculation and 
analysis. I discuss the results in detail in the following sections.  
Programmatic Locations 
In table 1, I classify responding programs into major categories 
according to the name of their department or academic unit. According to 
this breakdown, 59% of programs offering a baccalaureate degree are 
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housed in departments of language and literature or English.11 By 
comparison, 43% of programs offering a certificate are housed in such 
departments, suggesting that certificates enjoy relative freedom from 
technical communication’s traditional academic home of English. In 
addition, certificates also show up in a greater diversity of programmatic 
locations, including those outside of traditional academic departments. 
The programs that I classified as “other” (each of which offer only 
certificates) belong to the following departments or academic units:  
• College of Extended and International Education, 
• Community Education and Training, 
• Business and Professional Development, 
• Continuing Studies, and  
• Business and Management. 
                                                
11 See also Harner and Rich’s 2005 study, “Trends in Undergraduate Curriculum in 
Scientific and Technical Communication Programs.” Of the 80 programs they study, 
61% belong to departments of English (214). 
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Table 1. Department or academic unit for all responding programs, for 
programs offering a bachelor’s (or concentration), and for programs 
offering a certificate. 
 
 All Baccalaureate Certificate  
 Department or unit n % n % n % 
 English/Language and Lit. 32 55 22 59 15 43 
 Technical Communication 9 16 7 19 8 23 
 Communication 4 7 3 8 2 6 
 Writing 5 9 3 8 2 6 
 Humanities 3 5 3 8 3 9 
 Other  5 9 0 0 5 1 
 Total: 58 100 37 100 35 100 
 
Age and Size of Programs 
The following are the major results that I developed regarding the 
age and size of responding programs, as reported in questions 6a–d and 
7a–d of the survey: 
• Certificate programs in technical communication—while certainly 
an established phenomenon—are newer relative to baccalaureate 
degree programs. The average age of baccalaureate programs, in 
2008, was 18 years, with programs ranging in age from 0 to 50 
years (SD = 11.1). The average reported age of certificate programs 
was 14.3 years, with programs ranging in age from 1 to 28 years 
(SD = 8.3).  
• Program sizes vary widely, but baccalaureate programs have larger 
enrollments than certificate programs. Baccalaureate programs 
reported an average of 40.4 enrolled students at the time of the 
survey, and ranged from 2 to 250 students (SD = 45.0). Certificate 
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programs reported an average of 26.2 enrolled students, and ranged 
from 0 to 370 students (SD = 54.8).  
• Baccalaureate programs outpace certificates in graduating students. 
Responding baccalaureate programs conferred an average of 10.4 
baccalaureate degrees during the course of the 2006–07 academic 
year (SD = 8.30). During the same year, certificate programs 
conferred an average of 9.0 certificates (SD = 8.97). Responding 
programs conferred a lifetime total of 5,597 baccalaureate degrees 
over 660 baccalaureate program-years—a historical average of 8.5 
degrees awarded per year per program. They also conferred a 
lifetime total of 2,935 certificates over 431 certificate program-
years—a historical average of 6.8 certificates awarded per year per 
program.  
Degree and Certificate Requirements 
The following are the major results that I developed regarding 
degree and certificate requirements, as reported in the multipart questions 
6 and 7: 
• Most certificates (86%, n = 34) can be earned independently of any 
other degree, and do not require students to be concurrently 
enrolled in some other degree program.  
• The average certificate requires roughly one-fourth the coursework 
of the average baccalaureate degree. Baccalaureate programs require 
an average of 29.3 courses (both within and without the 
department) for program completion, while certificates require an 
average of 7.6 courses (SD = 4.34). Expressed in terms of semester 
hours, baccalaureate programs require an average of 91.1 semester 
hours (SD = 50.9), while certificates require an average of 25.5 
semester hours (SD = 14.5).  
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• Certificates are slower paced than baccalaureates. The average 
anticipated time to completion for certificates is about half that of 
baccalaureate degrees, despite the fact that certificates only require 
around one-fourth the coursework. When asked how much time 
students are anticipated to spend completing their program, 
respondents indicated an average of 6.8 terms for baccalaureate 
degrees (SD = 2.52) and 3.3 terms for certificates (SD = 1.45). 
Expressed in weeks of instruction, respondents anticipate on 
average 99 weeks for baccalaureate degree completion (SD = 33.2) 
and 48 weeks for certificate completion (SD = 23.5).  
• While they are just as likely as baccalaureate programs to offer at 
least some course content online, certificates are much more likely 
to be obtainable entirely online. Nearly two-thirds of baccalaureate 
degrees (66%, n = 35) offer some online courses, as do an equal 
portion of certificate programs (66%, n = 35). However, only 6% of 
baccalaureate degree programs can be completed entirely online 
(n = 35), while 31% of certificate programs can (n = 35).  
• Baccalaureate programs are much more likely to require an 
internship than certificate programs are. Fifty-eight percent of 
baccalaureate programs require an internship for program 
completion (n = 33), while only 17% of certificate programs do (n = 
35).  
Instructor Degrees and Professional Status 
The following are the major results I developed concerning the 
degrees and professional status of instructors who regularly teach technical 
communication, as reported in questions 11, 12, and 14a–f (see table 2): 
• Few technical communication instructors hold degrees specifically 
in the disciplines of technical communication, technical writing, 
business writing, or professional writing. About one in three 
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instructors in all responding programs can claim such academic 
preparation.12 In programs offering a certificate and only a 
certif icate, this ratio falls to one in five. 
• Certificate program instructors have less professional status. 
Although they possess more industry and professional experience, 
certificate program instructors hold fewer academic credentials and 
are less likely to be on the tenure track. More specifically, if a 
program offers a certificate, compared to instructors in programs 
offering a baccalaureate degree or concentration its technical 
communication instructors are: 
o about one and one-half times as likely to have industry or 
professional experience, 
o just as likely to have a degree specifically in the disciplines 
of technical communication, technical writing, business 
writing, or professional writing; 
o three-fourths as likely to have a doctorate; and 
o four-fifths as likely to hold a tenure-track position. 
• Technical communication instructors in programs that offer a 
certificate and only a certif icate have even less professional status. 
That is, such instructors, relative to the instructors in programs 
offering a baccalaureate degree or concentration, are: 
                                                
12 This is consistent with data on hiring reported in Carolyn Rude and Kelli Cargile 
Cook’s study “The Academic Job Market in Technical Communication, 2002–2003.” In 
that year, “While PhDs in technical or professional communication were the most 
commonly hired, they filled fewer than one-third (29%) of the primary positions that 
advertised for someone with their specialty” (61). Rude and Cook attribute this to the 
fact that “current doctoral programs cannot graduate sufficient doctorates to fill the 
market’s need,” as well as the lack of exclusive demand for technical communication 
specialists (61). 
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o about one and two-thirds times as likely to have industry or 
professional experience, 
o two-thirds as likely to have a degree specifically in the 
disciplines of technical communication, technical writing, 
business writing, or professional writing; 
o three-fifths as likely to have a doctorate; and 
o three-fifths as likely to hold a tenure-track position. 
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Academic Specializations of Instructors 
 In question 13, I asked participants about the academic 
specializations of program instructors who regularly teach technical 
communication courses in their program, but who do not hold degrees 
expressly in technical communication, technical writing, business writing, 
or professional writing. Their responses, which I categorized by major type, 
are listed in table 3. Across all programs, instructors who regularly teach 
technical communication courses demonstrate a diverse range of academic 
specializations. Their most commonly listed specializations, however, are 
the English-related fields of composition and rhetoric, literary studies, and 
English (general or unspecified). The 19 responses comprising the “other” 
category of specializations are as follows: 
• Design 
• Engineering 
• Film/Media Studies 
• Graphic Arts/Graphic Design (2) 
• Information Design 
• Instructional Design 
• Journalism (2) 
• Law 
• Liberal Arts 
• Management 
• Nuclear Engineering 
• Philosophy 
• Psychology 
• Science and Technology Studies (2) 
• Systems Engineering 
• Web Design 
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Table 3. Reported specializations of instructors who regularly teach 
technical communication, but who do not have a degree specifically in the 
disciplines of technical communication, technical writing, business writing, 
or professional writing. 
Specialization Responses 
Composition and Rhetoric 30 
Literary Studies 29 
English (general or unspecified) 16 
Education 5 
Communication  5 
Linguistics 4 
Creative Writing 3 
Other 19 
Summary of Results 
In all, compared to baccalaureate programs, certificate programs in 
technical communication:  
• are less likely to be housed within departments of English; 
• are younger; 
• are smaller in enrollment; 
• graduate fewer students; 
• are more likely to be earnable completely online; 
• are much less likely to require an internship; 
• have instructors with more industry experience; 
• have fewer instructors holding technical communication–
specific degrees; 
• have fewer instructors on the tenure track; and 
• have instructors with fewer academic credentials overall. 
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As rules of thumb, technical communication certificates can be earned 
independently of any other degree, and they require about one-fourth the 
coursework of a baccalaureate but take half the time to complete. 
Regardless of whether their program offers a certificate or a baccalaureate, 
only one in three technical communication instructors hold a degree 
specifically in technical communication, technical writing, professional 
writing, and business writing. However, if a program offers a certificate 
and only a certificate, this ratio drops to one in five.  
Conclusions 
As I noted in the introduction, in my 2003 study of certificate 
programs, “Certificate Programs in Technical Communication: Looking 
Closer, through Sophistic Eyes,” I found that certificate programs enjoy 
great flexibility at both the curricular and programmatic levels. In that 
study, I performed an examination of certificate program curricula 
nationwide and concluded that such programs “vary wildly,” are “disparate 
and wide-ranging,” and that “no core curriculum can be said to exist 
among them.” In a survey I conducted for that study, I also found that 
certificate programs demonstrate a strong concern for the needs of local 
industry (as compared, say, to broader professional standards). I found that 
a majority of programs make use of an industry advisory board, recruit 
from local industry, and/or employ some other means of gathering 
feedback from local industry. As I concluded, the curricular flexibility and 
the local orientation of certificates  
are consistent with a conception of technical 
communication as a postmodern profession in a market 
where no standard, universally-required skill set has 
emerged—whether from the collective needs of industry or 
as a result of professionalizing gestures from elsewhere. 
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I believe that the present study further corroborates this depiction of 
certificates as a flexible and indeterminate course of preparation for a field 
whose contours remain—likewise—flexible and indeterminate.  
In general, technical communication certificate programs are not as 
established as baccalaureate programs are (as indicated by program age, 
enrollments, and graduation rates). Compared to baccalaureates, certificate 
program instructors have less professional status in the form of academic 
credentials, access to the tenure track, and technical communication–
specific degrees. And since certificate programs are much less likely to 
require an internship for program completion, their curricula appear to 
offer less by way of experiential learning (see Little “Technical”). At first 
glance, then, it is tempting to declare certificates to be relatively 
impoverished on grounds of their curricula, the professional status of their 
instructors, and their “establishedness” as programs. 
However, certificates also show signs of being less tradition-bound 
than baccalaureate degrees. That is, certificate programs are less tied to the 
brick-and-mortar university (in that they are more likely to be earnable 
online) and they are less tied to the traditional departmental home of 
English (in that they are more likely to fall into a diverse range of 
programmatic locations outside of English). In addition, instructors in 
certificate programs are much more likely to have industry or professional 
experience than instructors in baccalaureate programs—while they cannot 
claim the same level of academic preparation as baccalaureate instructors, 
they can claim more practical, non-academic experience. I believe that 
these results support the notion that certificates are more flexible and less 
academically oriented than their baccalaureate counterparts.  
Certificate programs’ precise impact on the status of technical 
communication as a profession and a discipline remains uncertain. Given 
that certificate programs are less established and have instructors with less 
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professional status, certificates may—at least on the academic side—serve 
to undermine efforts to achieve material security for those in the field. 
However, this study also suggests a number of other, more telling 
conclusions about the status of the field and its instructors. Across all 
programs, fewer than one in three instructors of technical communication 
hold degrees in the disciplines of technical communication, technical 
writing, business writing, or professional writing. Of those instructors not 
holding technical communication–specific degrees, their most commonly 
listed specializations are in English-related areas. Some three out of every 
five baccalaureate programs are housed within departments of English, as 
are about two out of every five certificate programs.13 
While these results are hardly surprising, they do serve as an 
immediate confirmation and reminder that technical communication—at 
least as reflected in the staffing and location of academic programs—is far 
from achieving disciplinary autonomy and professionalization. Technical 
communication’s lack of practical distinction from English studies 
suggests that it has yet to attain many of what Gerald J. Savage enumerates 
as the defining features of a modernist profession (“Process”; “Tricksters” 
169), particularly the features of market closure, self-regulation, and a 
formalized body of knowledge. Beyond the present survey, of course, there 
are other signs that the goal of modernist professionalization remains 
unrealized: the lack of standard—or even consistent—curricula for 
certificates and baccalaureate degrees (Harner and Rich; Nugent, 
“Looking”); the failure to establish certification for instructors or 
                                                
13 I don’t mean here to join the fray concerning English departments’ status as the 
predominant scholarly home for technical communication (see Dragga), nor do I intend 
to speak to the larger disciplinary-political shifts occurring in English studies (see 
Ostergaard et al.). Rather, I intend for these results to speak only to the current status of 
the projects of professionalization and discipline formation within technical 
communication. 
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practitioners (Turner and Rainey); and even the broad range of names that 
are used for our academic programs, scholarly journals, and the field itself 
(see chapter 4). In light of the much larger hurdles still facing the projects 
of professionalization and disciplinary legitimization, I suggest that the 
particular anxieties surrounding certificate programs are, at least for the 
time being, misplaced. Particularly as certificate programs do not show 
signs of surpassing baccalaureate programs in enrollments or graduation 
rates, there likely remain more productive battles to wage in technical 
communication’s war for professional and disciplinary status (to use a 
fraught, but possibly apt, metaphor). 
Certificates may, in fact, be poised to advance the status of 
technical communication by encouraging the growth of academic 
programs. Because of the reduced barriers to setting up new certificates 
compared to other types of programs (Little, “Designing” 275), certificates 
could help bring a certain strength in numbers to technical 
communication, achieving at least one important measure of disciplinary 
and professional standing: ubiquity. Further, thoughtfully designed 
certificates could play a role in ensuring that technical communication’s 
growth remains healthy. As Robert R. Johnson suggests, one strategy for 
long-term sustainability 
is for programs to become more focussed and specialized. 
Each program, in other words, could have distinct and 
recognizable purposes beyond the pail of general technical 
communication. In short, we could consider creating 
programs that present “pockets of specialties”: programs 
where students can go to focus on strong and well 
developed areas of curriculum and scholarship that will be 
fruitful for students and faculty alike. (“Deeply” 117) 
Because of their flexibility and concern for local needs (Little, “Designing” 
275; Nugent, “Looking”), certificates could be ideally positioned to help 
establish these sorts of strategic programs. For example, Bowling Green 
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State University and the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee have each 
recently inaugurated certificates with a special emphasis on international 
technical communication, and the University of Washington Educational 
Outreach currently offers a user-centered design certificate. These 
existence of these programs suggests that certificates are flexible enough to 
accommodate emerging issues in the field and are able to offer 
specializations in the way that Johnson advocates. 
 I should note, though, that the possibilities I sketch here remain 
largely speculative. More in-depth research is called for—research on the 
students, the graduates, the individual contexts, and the administration of 
certificate programs, both qualitative and quantitative—in order to more 
accurately gauge certificates’ impact on the field. However, in the next 
section, I suggest how certificates may speak in a more potent and 
theoretical way to our current professional and scholarly conversations 
about the disciplinary and professional status of technical communication. 
As I find, neosophistic theory may suggest a way to step outside of these 
conversations entirely as they are currently framed. 
Discussion and Theoretical Implications 
I would like to conclude this chapter by reiterating and expanding 
on a framework for theorizing the technical communication certificate 
program that I first articulated in my earlier study (“Looking”). As Gerald 
J. Savage demonstrates in his chapter “Tricksters, Fools, and Sophists: 
Technical Communication as Postmodern Rhetoric,” the sophist provides 
a compelling model for the identity of the technical communicator: 
[T]he work of technical writing seems to be consistent with 
a sophistic practice in which knowledge is always 
contingent, in which rhetorical purpose must be reconciled 
to the needs of a particular audience at a particular time 
and place. Technical writing as we find it today has 
emerged in relation to particular economic, political, and 
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technological circumstances which combine in complex and 
contradictory ways that make the work our practitioners do 
both useful and disruptive, both materially rewarding and 
risky […] Yet these circumstances present us with the 
strongest argument for accepting the apparently weak role 
of the non-expert, unrecognized, incompletely 
professionalized, uncertified, hard to define sophist-
technical communicator. (189) 
By conceiving of technical communication as a sophistic profession, its 
members become “politically and socially engaged communicators who 
recognize the inevitability of their texts as socially transformative” (171). 
Its members also embrace their status as “liminal subjects,” “occupying 
marginal zones between the subject matter expert and the lay audience, 
trading status both in the corporation and in larger society for relative 
freedom to travel across the boundaries of these social-cultural domains” 
(180). 
Here Savage is drawing on the concept of the “liminal subject,” as 
characterized in the work of Joseph Jeyaraj. In his 2004 article “Liminality 
and Othering: The Issue of Rhetorical Authority in Technical Discourse” 
Jeyaraj depicts liminal spaces and subjects as such: 
Liminal spaces are different from normal spaces located 
within particular discourses because of their flexibility and 
openness. Well-established discourse communities have 
clearly developed discursive patters, social structures, mores, 
and conventions. […] However, people in liminal positions 
[…] because they are not located firmly within the 
discursive patterns of a community, have more 
opportunities to form practices that transgress some of 
those discursive patters. (16) 
I contend that the certificate program in technical communication can be 
theorized as occupying a liminal zone: a particularly sophistic space 
between academy and industry, theory and practice, education and 
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training, local and universal. Just as sophism concentrates on the individual 
locations and contexts of knowledge production at the expense of 
“predictive, generalizing models” (Savage, “Tricksters” 186), certificate 
programs often situate themselves to meet the practical needs of local 
industry (Little, “Designing” 278, Nugent, “Looking”). Just as sophism 
threatens the modernist distinction between theory and practice (Leff 24; 
J. Scott 193), the situation of the certificate program between academy and 
industry lends it the potential to collapse theory and practice into new 
conceptions of professional identity. Certificate programs, I assert, are 
theoretically consistent with—and are situated to support the work of—
technical communication as a sophistic profession. 
In Savage’s characterization of technical communication as 
sophistic, the field avoids the impulse to achieve market closure and the 
vestments of a modernist profession. In exchange for giving up a 
determinate set of professional knowledges—not to mention their 
attendant status and security—the field wins the ability to remain flexible 
in the face of an ever-changing postindustrial workplace (“Tricksters,” 
188–9). To Savage, such flexibility is a source of strength for technical 
communication, particularly in a world “in which no position can be 
counted on to last, in which change seems to rule and the ability to adapt 
to change is most valued” (189). As I find, certificate programs 
demonstrate a number of decidedly sophistic traits that are consistent with 
Savage’s characterization. 
 As John Poulakos notes in his volume Sophistical Rhetoric in 
Classical Greece, the ancient, traveling sophists were compelled in their 
practice to “adjust themselves to different laws and institutions, 
accommodate a variety of students, and tailor their messages to suit the 
sensibilities and tastes of their diverse audiences” (25; see also Savage, 
“Tricksters” 187). Similarly, I find in my 2003 study that certificate 
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programs demonstrate diverse and flexible curricula that are informed by 
the needs of local industry. The ancient sophists also “lived and worked 
more according to the circumstances they encountered and less according 
to established custom or principle” (Poulakos, Sophistical 25; see also 
Savage, “Tricksters” 186). Similarly, I find in the present study that, relative 
to baccalaureate programs, certificates are less established and tradition-
bound. Finally, the ancient sophists, while quite successful in their own 
right, were deprived of many traditional forms of status in ancient Greece 
(Savage, “Tricksters” 186). Similarly, I find that certificate program 
instructors have less status in the form of academic preparation and 
tenure-track appointments. The certificate in technical communication is, 
I conclude, a particularly sophistic credential for a particularly sophistic 
field.  
Of course, sophistic theory offers more than just descriptive 
frameworks: I believe that it also offers important prescriptions for the 
successful design and implementation of certificate programs. Platonic 
curricula—which sophistic curricula can be said to be articulated against—
would hold that the practices of technical communication are entirely 
reducible to formalizable first principles, and therefore such curricula only 
demand sufficient classroom time to facilitate the “transfer” of formalized 
knowledge from teacher to student. These curricula are what a number of 
recent commentators have in mind when they call for the drafting of fixed 
lists of “core competencies” and a “codified body of knowledge” for the 
field of technical communication (see Turner and Rainey; Rainey, 
“Approaches”). In contrast to such curricula, a thoroughly sophistic 
curriculum recognizes that the practice of technical communication is 
contingent, localized, and social, and therefore it makes space beyond the 
classroom for students to develop appropriate professional capacities in 
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context. A sophistic curriculum, in other words, demands social 
engagement. 
As Jarratt notes in Rereading the Sophists, “the sophists could be 
termed the first public intellectuals in a democracy” (98). Sophism is, by its 
nature, publicly accountable and “immersed in the adjudication of 
immediate cultural concerns” (Crowley 318), an attribute that Savage also 
foregrounds in his characterization of the sophist technical communicator 
(“Tricksters” 171). In his 1995 article “Sophistic Ethics in the Technical 
Writing Classroom: Teaching Nomos, Deliberation, and Action,” J. Blake 
Scott calls for the incorporation of sophistic ethics into technical 
communication pedagogy:  
We can begin by teaching technical writing as praxis or 
social action, as others have proposed. A praxis pedagogy 
approaches writing as social enculturation […] We should 
help our students problematize their enculturation and roles 
as writers in different communities by addressing issues of 
politics and power. (195) 
Internships, Scott notes, are a particularly effective means “to teach ethical 
enculturation,” as are orientation videos, sample texts, guest speakers, 
participation in “virtual businesses” and digital communities, and the use 
of case studies (196). Although I find in my earlier study that certificates 
are socially engaged insofar as they are committed to the interests of local 
industry, the present study suggests that fewer than two in five certificates 
require an internship for program completion. Given that certificates are 
also slower-paced than baccalaureate degrees, this discrepancy cannot be 
attributed solely to lack of time or curricular space. With regards to 
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internships, it appears that certificate programs need to do more to prepare 
students for their social roles in a sophistic profession.14 
Another strategy that neosophistic theory recommends for 
program design is the incorporation of reflexive professional development. 
As J. Blake Scott notes, “perhaps the most important kind of deliberation 
to the sophists […] was inner deliberation through the internalization of 
logos. […] The sophists’ students entered dialogues with themselves in 
order to master logos and develop their own ethical codes” (192–3). When 
seen as a sophistic profession, the qualification of a technical 
communicator is not a discrete skill set that he or she possesses; rather it is 
a professional ethos that he or she has developed. Phrased another way, the 
identity of the sophist–technical communicator can be seen not so much 
as a subjectivity (one who possesses knowledge in the Platonic sense), but 
rather as an intersubjectivity (one possessed of a certain ethos, or way of 
acting within and among social realms). This intersubjectivity is not 
assumable by rote and it cannot be taught through a Platonic curriculum 
of disjointed courses; it must be developed instead by allowing students to 
make the connections between their coursework and the social realm of 
technical communication in practice. This development can be facilitated, 
I believe, through self-conscious reflexivity. 
Such reflexivity is comprised of an explicit engagement on behalf 
of the student with the issue of what it means to be a practitioner of 
technical communication. It can take the curricular form of retrospective 
portfolios, capstone projects, student symposia, close instructor advising, or 
                                                
14 Nonetheless, it remains to be seen if programs enact social engagement at other levels: 
for instance if students already work extensively in local industry, or if individual courses 
and pedagogical methods already emerge from local needs. These possibilities again 
suggest the need for more in-depth, quantitative and qualitative research on the 
individual contexts of certificate programs. 
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even developmental journals; but the end goal of these activities should be 
for students to self-consciously adopt the professional ethos of a technical 
communicator within—and as shaped by—their specific social and cultural 
contexts. To be sure, such reflexive practice is conceived here not as a 
Platonic act of philosophical contemplation but as a sophistic act of 
rhetorical engagement: each of these activities should be constructed with 
a genuine audience, purpose, and context. Through these kinds of reflexive 
activities, students are provided with the curricular space to make 
developmental connections through social and discursive means. Although 
it is not certain the extent to which the kind of reflective professional 
development that I am sketching here is a part of current certificate 
programs, it remains an intriguing question for future researchers, as well 
as a compelling consideration for the design of any technical 
communication curriculum. 
Of course, technical communication certificate programs are not 
completely unproblematic. While they are characteristically sophistic in 
their flexibility, this feature is also suggests the possibility for misuse. Little 
observes that the flexible nature of the certificate and its relative lack of 
administrative oversight 
could result in questions about its quality. Without the 
application of standards, either legislated or mandated by 
educational codes as they are for degrees, certificates may 
not gain much acceptance as credentials for hiring or 
promotion, especially beyond the regional area the 
institution serves. (“Designing” 276) 
To be sure, the kind of broad curricular standards that Little alludes to do 
not exist. Despite Roy K. Turner and Kenneth T. Rainey’s expressed 
optimism that an empirical examination of existing programs “would move 
the profession a long way toward standardized essential competencies” 
(222), research into the curricula of both baccalaureate (Harner and Rich) 
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and certificate (Nugent, “Looking”) programs reveals very few areas of 
curricular overlap that could support such nationwide standards. 
Nonetheless, Little presents us with an important caution: by embracing 
flexibility or location alone, it is possible for certificates to become simply 
“value added” credentials that serve the most immediate material interests 
of schools or students while failing to provide relevant preparation for the 
situated practice of technical communication. Without broader standards, 
the argument runs, what is to stop “anything goes” from becoming the sole 
guiding principle for certificate programs?  
Sophistic theory suggests a strategy for program design that I 
believe addresses this possibility. Just as the sophists remain attentive to 
their context and the particular needs of their audiences, certificate 
programs should remain thoroughly attentive to the needs of their 
stakeholders. Whether regional or national, whether individual or 
collective, whether in the academy or in industry, many groups have a 
legitimate stake in the construction of certificate programs: universities, 
departments, students, instructors, administrators, neighboring academic 
programs, local industry, professional groups, scholarly organizations, and 
so on. In the continuing absence of broader curricular standards in 
technical communication, soliciting steady feedback from such a broad 
range of stakeholders may be the most effective check we have against 
“anything goes” program configurations.  
It may also be our best chance for building programs that are 
successful—not just instrumentally, but also in terms of offering quality 
instruction. Just as J. Blake Scott contends that the nomoi of the 
community can be a viable source for ethics in the technical 
communication practice and pedagogy (192–4), the standards of rigorous 
and ethical instruction for certificate programs can emerge from the 
negotiated claims of the stakeholders that they serve. While some of the 
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commentary on certificates suggests that they are attentive to both 
students (Worley) and local industry (Nugent, “Looking”) as stakeholder 
groups, it remains to be seen what other groups are allowed to have a hand 
in shaping certificate programs, how negotiations take place among those 
groups, and how the dynamics of power affect the outcomes of such 
negotiations. 
Regardless of whether technical communication will eventually 
enjoy the status of a modernist profession, playing to multiple stakeholder 
audiences and balancing their competing interests remains our best (if 
only) available guide in the absence of broader curricular standards, fixed 
knowledges, and core competencies. More importantly, we should be 
prepared for the possibility that, given the sophistic rhetorical character 
and kairotic nature of technical communication, these kinds of 
foundational standards may never emerge. As Savage notes, the “path of 
professionalization for technical communication” may very well be “a blind 
maze—many branches but with no way out to the goal we envision.” 
(“Tricksters” 170). As an alternative to this, he implores, 
Let us, rather than waging a tiresome and increasingly 
frustrating war of position for professional status, consider 
the possibility of teaching for a postmodern practice, a 
navigating practice, like the wily Odysseus, not mastering 
but negotiating continually shifting technologies, 
institutions, discourses, and cultures. (“Tricksters” 189) 
As I contend, the thoughtful design and implementation of certificate 
programs should be seen as an important strategy for realizing the 
alternative, sophistic conception of technical communication that Savage 
illustrates.  
Perhaps more radically, however, we may also want to consider that 
the “alternative” Savage describes here is, in fact, no alternative at all. That 
is, the instrumental success of technical communication as a profession 
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and discipline may not just be a matter of placing new, postmodern 
notions of professionalism alongside our received, modernist conceptions. 
Instead, we may want to consider that all professions, academic disciplines, 
and educational programs are always already constructed by the activities 
of negotiation and navigation that Savage describes. We may want to 
entertain the notion that all disciplines and professions are constituted 
rhetorically (i.e. discursively), and further, sophistically (i.e. without 
reference to an extra-discursive or transcendent reality). Lastly, we may 
also want to consider that nomoi and the competing claims of stakeholders, 
audiences, and communities are the only measures of ethical rectitude that 
we will ever possess—not just within technical communication, but 
anywhere. With the full articulation of these notions of sophistic 
disciplinarity, professionalization, and ethics lying beyond the scope of the 
present study, however, I offer these ideas only as possibilities here. 
I hope I have made clear that I do not see the value of sophism as a 
means to excuse program configurations that are convenient, but otherwise 
indefensible. I also do not mean to suggest that we should give up on 
seeking increased status for technical communication, that we should stop 
trying to articulate its identity as a discipline or profession, or that we 
should cede total control of our academic programs to a group of varied 
interests. Rather, in offering a model of professional identity as an 
alternative to those of market closure and fixity, I contend that sophistic 
rhetoric suggests a more situated, more responsible, and even more 
strategic, figuration for the technical communicator. My research on 
certificates shows that they are consistent with a sophistic model of 
programmatic flexibility, concern for local needs, and practical orientation. 
However, the sophistic model also provides important cautions for the 
design and administration of certificate programs. A sophistically 
informed certificate program should remain socially engaged, and it should 
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present opportunities for students to work in real social contexts. In 
addition, a sophistically informed certificate program should be reflective: 
it should present opportunities for students to reflexively and self-
consciously develop their professional ethos. 
Again, I make no claims to transcendence or universality in the 
research and interpretations I present here, and I hope that I have avoided 
any of the familiar “god-trick” rhetorical techniques that would suggest 
otherwise. I also hope that the information and discussion I have 
presented here are useful—either for participants in conversations within 
the field or for those considering the development of their own certificate 
programs. Sophistic rhetorical theory, I believe, provides an invaluable 
theoretical model—one that is both descriptive and prescriptive—for 
building and understanding certificate programs in technical 
communication. 
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† Bellevue Community College 
Department of Business and Professional Development 
10700 Northup Way 
Bellevue, WA 98004-1416  
 Bentley College 
Adamian Graduate Center 083 
175 Forest Street 
Waltham, MA 02452  
 Boise State University 
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 Bowling Green State University 
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Bowling Green, OH 43403-0001  
† Brigham Young University 
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† California State University, East Bay 
Continuing and International Education 
25800 Carlos Bee Blvd. 
Hayward, CA 94542-3000  
† California State University, Fullerton 
College Park, Suite 100 
2600 Nutwood Ave. 
Fullerton, CA 92834-6870  
† California State University, Long Beach 
Department of English 
1250 Bellflower Boulevard 
Long Beach, CA 90840-0001  
† California State Universtiy, Chico 
English Department 
400 West First Street 
Chico, CA 95929-0001  
† Carnegie Mellon University 
Department of English 
5000 Forbes Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890  
† Cedarville University 
251 Main Street 
Cedarville, OH 45314-8564  
† Chicago State University 
Department of English and Speech 
9501 South King Drive, SCI 320 
Chicago, IL 60628-1598  
† Christopher Newport University 
Department of English 
Newport News, VA 23601-3301  
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 Clemson University 
Strode Tower 
English Department 
Clemson, SC 29634  
† Cleveland State University 
Division of Continuing Education 
 2121 Euclid Avenue 
Cleveland, OH 44115-2214  
† College of DuPage 
Liberal Arts Division 
425 Fawell Boulevard 
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137-6599  
† College of Lake County 
Technical Communication And Multimedia Programs 
19351 West Washington Street 
Grayslake, IL 60030-1198  
 Colorado State University 
Department of Journalism and Technical Communication 
Fort Collins, CO 80523-1785  
 Columbus State Community College 
550 E. Spring St. 
Columbus, OH 43216  
† DeAnza College 
Department of Technical Writing 
 21250 Stevens Creek Blvd. 
Cupertino, CA 95014-5797  
 Delta College 
English Division 
1961 Delta Rd. 
University Center, MI 48710-0001  
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† Drexel University 
Department of Culture and Communication 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-2816  
† Duke University 
Continuing Studies 
Box 90700 
Durham, NC 27708-0700  
† East Carolina University 
Department of English 
2100 Bate Building 
Greenville, NC 27858-4353  
† Eastern Kentucky University 
Case Annex 497 
521 Lancaster Avenue 
Richmond, KY 0475-3102  
† Eastern Michigan University 
612 Pray Harrold Hall 
Ypsilanti, MI 48197-2207  
† Eastern Washington University 
Department of English 
250 Patterson Hall 
Cheney, WA 99004-2430  
 Elon University 
Campus Box 2349 
Elon, NC 27244  
 Fairfield University 
1073 N. Benson Rd. 
DMH 130 
Fairfield, CT 06824-5195  
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 Farmingdale State College 
Knapp Hall 
Farmingdale, NY 11735  
† Ferris State University 
Department of Languages and Literature 
820 Campus Drive 
ASC 3080-A 
Big Rapids, MI 49307-2225  
 Florida State University 
Academic and Professional Program Services 
Center for Professional Development  
C3500 University Center 
Tallahassee, FL 32306-2550  
 Francis Marion University 
McNair 101-F 
Florence, SC 29501  
 Gateway Technical College 
1001 S. Main Street 
Racine, WI 53403  
 George Mason University 
Department of English 
Robinson A 487 
4400 University Drive, MSN 3E4 
Fairfax, VA 22030  
† Georgia Southern University 
Writing and Linguistics Department 
1118 Newton Bldg.  
P.O. Box 8026 
Statesboro, GA 30460-0002  
 Hilbert College 
5200 South Park Avenue 
Hamburg, NY 14075  
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† Illinois Institute of Technology 
3301 S. Dearborn 
Chicago, IL 60616-2973  
 Illinois State University 
English Department 
Campus Box 4240 
Normal, IL 61790-4240  
† Indiana University East 
Whitewater Hall 254 
2325 Chester Blvd. 
Richmond, IN 47374-1289  
† Indiana University South Bend 
Department of English 
1700 Mishawaka Ave.  
P.O. Box 7111 
South Bend, IN 46634-7111  
† Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis 
Technical Communication Program 
799 W. Michigan St. ET 324F 
Indianapolis, IN 46202-2896 
† Iowa State University 
Department of English 
203 Ross Hall 
Ames, IA 50011-1201  
† James Madison University 
Institute of Technical and Scientific Communication 
MSC 2108 
Harrisonburg, VA 22807-0002  
† Kansas State University 
108-C English 
Counseling Services Building 
Manhattan, KS 66506-0305  
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† Kaplan University 
6301 Kaplan University Ave. 
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309-1905  
 Kennesaw State University 
English Department, EB155 
1000 Chastain Rd. #3301 
Kennesaw, GA 30144-5588  
† King College 
Department of Technical and Professional Communication 
1350 King College Road 
Bristol, TN 37620-2649  
 Kutztown University 
Department of English 
Lytle Hall 
Kutztown, PA 19530  
† Lawrence Technological University 
College of Arts and Sciences 
21000 West Ten Mile Road 
Southfield, MI 48075-1058  
 Louisiana State University in Shreveport 
One University Place 
Shreveport, LA 71115  
† Louisiana Tech University 
School of Literature and Language 
P.O. Box 3162 
Ruston, LA 71272-0001  
† Madison Area Technical College 
3550 Anderson Street  
Room 246 
Madison, WI 53704-2599  
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† Madonna University 
English and Communication Arts 
36600 Schoolcraft Road 
Livonia, MI 48150-1176  
† Mercer University 
Mercer University School of Engineering 
1400 Coleman Avenue 
Macon, GA 31207-0001  
† Metropolitan State College of Denver 
Department of Technical Communication and Media 
P.O. Box 173362 
Campus Box 35 
Denver, CO 80217-3362  
† Metropolitan State University 
Suite 205, Energy Park Place 
1380 Energy Lane 
St. Paul, MN 55108-5253  
† Miami University 
English Department 
Bachelor Hall 
Oxford, OH 45056-3506  
† Michigan Technological University 
Department of Humanities 
1400 Townsend Dr. 
Houghton, MI 49930  
† Middlesex Community College 
591 Springs Road 
Bedford, MA 01730-1197  
† Milwaukee School of Engineering 
1025 N. Broadway 
Milwaukee, WI 53202-3109  
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† Minnesota State University, Mankato 
Department of English 
230 Armstrong Hall 
Mankato, MN 56001-6079  
† Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Department of English and Technical Communication 
Rolla, MO 65409-0001  
† Missouri Western State University 
222 Eder Hall 
4525 Downs Dr. 
St. Joseph, MO 64507-2294  
† Montana Tech of the University of Montana 
PTC Department 
Engineering Hall 208D 
Butte, MT 59701-8997  
† Montgomery College 
Department of Communications 
20200 Observation Drive 
Germantown, MD 20876-4067  
† Moraine Park Technical College 
235 N. National Avenue 
Fond du Lac, WI 54935-2884  
† Murray State University 
Department of English and Philosophy 
7C Faculty Hall 
Murray, KY 42071  
 Nazareth College 
4245 East Ave. 
Rochester, NY 14618-3703  
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† New Jersey Institute of Technology 
Department of Humanities 
Newark, NJ 07102-1982  
† New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology 
Technical Communication Program 
801 Leroy Place 
Socorro, NM 87801-4750  
 New Mexico State University 
English Department MSC 3E 
P.O. Box 30001 
Las Cruces, NM 88003  
† New York Institute of Technology 
Department of English  
Northern Blvd. 
Old Westbury, NY 11568-1036  
† North Carolina State University at Raleigh 
Department of English 
Box 8105, NCSU 
Raleigh, NC 27695-8105  
† Northeastern University 
360 Huntington Ave. 
270 Ryder Hall 
Boston, MA 02115-5000  
 Northern Arizona University 
English Department 
Flagstaff, AZ 86011  
 Northern Illinois University 
Department of English 
DeKalb, IL 60115  
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† Oklahoma State University 
OSU Department of English 
205 Morrill Hall 
Stillwater, OK 74078-0002  
 Old Dominion University 
Department of English, BAL 5000 
Norfolk, VA 23529  
† Orange Coast College 
Department of Literature and Languages 
2701 Fairview Rd. 
Costa Mesa, CA 92626-5563  
 Penn State 
College of Liberal Arts 
143 Burrowes Building 
University Park, PA 16802  
† Pikes Peak Community College 
Department of English 
5675 S. Academy Blvd. 
Colorado Springs, CO 80906-5498  
† Pima Community College 
West Campus 
English Department 
2202 West Anklam Rd. 
Tucson, AZ 85709-0170  
† Pittsburg State University 
426 Grubbs Hall 
Pittsburg, KS 66762-7500  
† Polytechnic University 
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences 
6 MetroTech Center 
Brooklyn, NY 11201-2990  
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 Portland State University 
Department of English 
Portland, OR 97207-0751  
† Purdue University 
Department of English 
500 Oval Dr. 
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2038  
† Radford University 
English Department, 6935 
Radford, VA 24142-0002  
† Regis University 
Department of English 
3333 Regis Boulevard 
Denver, CO 80221-1099  
† Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
Department of Language, Literature, and Communication 
110 Eighth Street 
Troy, NY 12180-3590  
† Rhetoric and Writing @ Michigan State University 
5 Olds Hall 
East Lansing, MI 48824-1020  
† Rochester Institute of Technology 
Department of Communication 
College of Liberal Arts 
Rochester, NY 14623-5698  
† Rutgers 
Technical Writing Program 
96 Davidson Road 
Piscataway, NJ 08854-8062  
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† Sacramento State University 
College of Continuing Education 
3000 State University Drive East 
Sacramento, CA 95819-6103  
† Saginaw Valley State University 
Brown Hall 330 
University Center, MI 48710-0001  
† San Diego State University 
Department of Rhetoric and Writing Studies 
5500 Campanile Dr. 
San Diego, CA 92182-4452  
† San Francisco State University 
Technical and Professional Writing Program 
1600 Holloway Avenue 
San Francisco, CA 94132-4162  
† San José State University 
Department of English 
One Washington Square 
San José, CA 95192-0001  
 Shepherd College 
Department of English 
P.O. Box 5000 
Knutti Hall 
Shepherdstown, WV 25443  
 Southeastern Louisiana University 
English Department SLU 10861 
Hammond, LA 70402  
† Southern Polytechnic State University 
English, Technical Communication, and Media Arts 
Marietta, GA 30060-2896  
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 St. Edward’s University 
Box 103 
3001 South Congress Avenue 
Austin, TX 78704  
 State University of NY Institute of Technology 
Rt. 12 North Horatio St 
Utica, NY 13504  
 Stevens Institute of Technology 
1 Castle Point on Hudson  
Morton 208 
Hoboken, NJ 07030  
 SUNY–Cortland 
English Department 
Old Main, Room 115-A 
Cortland, NY 13045  
 Tennessee Technological University 
English Department 
Box 5053 
Cookeville, TN 38505  
 Texas A&M University 
Writing Programs Office 
234 Blocker Bldg. 
College Station, TX 77843-4227  
 Texas State University 
Department of English 
San Marcos, TX 78666  
† Texas Tech University 
English Department 
P. O. Box 43091 
Lubbock, TX 79409-0001  
  
 
 
 
 
157 
† Three Rivers Community College 
TRCC Humanities and Performing Arts Division 
2080 Three Rivers Blvd. 
Poplar Bluff, MO 63901-2350  
 Towson University 
College of Graduate Studies 
8000 York Road 
Towson, MD 21252  
 Troy University, Montgomery Campus 
Building 136, Room 104 
241 Montgomery ST 
Montgomery, AL 36104  
 University of Akron 
Department of English 
Olin Hall 301 
Akron, OH 44325-1906  
† University of Alabama in Huntsville 
English Department 
Huntsville, AL 35899-0001  
† University of Arkansas at Little Rock 
Department of Rhetoric and Writing 
2801 S. University Ave. 
Little Rock, Arkansas 72204-1099  
† University of California Berkeley Extension 
1995 University Ave. - Suite 110 
Berkeley, CA 94704-7000  
† University of California San Diego Extension 
9500 Gilman Dr - MC 0170A 
La Jolla, CA 92093  
† University of California Riverside Extension  
Riverside, CA 92521-0112  
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† University of California Santa Cruz Extension  
Cupertino Campus 
Business and Management Department 
10420 Bubb Road 
Cupertino, CA 95014-4150  
† University of Central Florida 
Department of English 
Orlando, FL 32816-1346  
† University of Colorado at Denver 
Department of Communication 
P. O. Box 173364 - Campus Box 176 
Denver, CO 80217-3364  
† University of Delaware 
University of Delaware Department of English 
Office 135 Memorial 
Newark, DE 19716-5600  
 University of Hartford 
200 Bloomfield Avenue 
West Hartford, CT 06117  
 University of Hawaii at Manoa 
English Department 
1733 Donaghho Road 
Honolulu, HI 96822  
† University of Houston–Downtown 
One Main Street 
Suite S-1045 
Houston, TX 77002-1001  
† University of Massachusetts Amherst 
481 Bartlett Hall 
University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, MA 01003  
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 University of Massachusetts Dartmouth 
UMD - Group 1, Room 341 
285 Old Westport Road 
North Dartmouth, MA 02747-2300  
† University of Massachusetts Lowell 
Department of English 
One University Avenue 
Lowell, MA 01854-5096  
† University of Michigan–Flint 
English Department 
303 E. Kearsley Street 
Flint, MI 48502-1950  
† University of Minnesota 
64 Classroom Office Building 
Buford Avenue 
Minneapolis, MN 55108-1004  
† University of Minnesota Rochester 
111 South Broadway 
Rochester, MN 55904-4945  
† University of Nebraska at Omaha 
English Department - ASH 189P 
Omaha, NE 68182-0175  
 University of Nevada Las Vegas 
Department of English 
4505 Maryland Parkway, Box 455011 
Las Vegas, NV 89154-5011  
 University of New Mexico 
One University of NM 
Department of English MSC 03 2170 
Albuquerque, NM 87131-0001  
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 University of North Carolina at Charlotte 
Department of English 
276F Fretwell Building 
Charlotte, NC 28223-0001  
 University of North Carolina at Wilmington 
Department of English 
601 S. College Road 
Wilmington, NC 28403  
 University of Northern Iowa 
117 Baker 
Mail Code 0502 
Cedar Falls, IA 50614-0502  
 University of Pittsburgh 
526 CL/English Department 
4200 5th Ave. 
Pittsburgh, PA 15260  
† University of South Florida 
Department of English, CPR 107 
4202 E. Fowler Avenue 
Tampa, FL 33620-9951  
 University of Southern California–Santa Barbara 
Writing Program 
South Hall 1520 
Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3010 
† University of Tennessee 
Department of English 
301 McClung Tower 
Knoxville, TN 37996-0001  
† University of Texas at San Antonio 
Department of Communication 
One UTSA Circle 
San Antonio, TX 78249-0643  
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† University of Washington 
14 Loew Hall, Box 352195 
Seattle, WA 98195-0005  
† University of Wisconsin–Madison 
Department of Engineering Professional Development 
432 North Lake Street 
Madison, WI 53706-1498  
† University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee 
Department of English 
Curtin Hall 
Milwaukee, WI 53201-0413  
† University of Wisconsin-Stout 
150C Harvey Hall 
Menomonie, WI 54751-0790  
 Utah State University 
English Department, 
3200 Old Main Hill 
Logan, UT 84322-3200  
 Virginia Tech 
Department of English, 0112 
Blacksburg, VA 24061  
 Washington State University Vancouver 
Department of English 
14204 NE Salmon Creek Ave. 
Vancouver, WA, 98686-9600  
 Washington State University 
Department of English 
Avery Hall 
Pullman, WA 99164  
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† Washtenaw Community College 
WCC Department of English/Writing 
4800 E. Huron River Dr.  
PO Box 1610 
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1610  
† Weber State University 
1201 University Circle 
Department of English 
Ogden, UT 84408-1201  
 West Chester University 
Main Hall 530 
West Chester, PA 19383  
† West Texas A&M University 
Department of English 
Box 60908 
Canyon, TX 79016-0001  
 West Virginia University 
230 Stansbury Hall 
Morgantown, WV 26506  
 Western Wisconsin Technical College 
304 Sixth Street N. 
La Crosse, WI 54601  
 Widener University 
One University Place 
Chester, PA 19013-5792  
 Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
ME Department 
100 Institute Rd 
Worcester, MA 01609  
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† Wright State University 
Department of English 
Dayton, OH 45435-0002  
 Youngstown State University 
Department of English 
One University Plaza 
Youngstown, OH, 44555 
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Appendix B: 
Survey Instrument 
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Appendix C: 
Survey Cover Letter 
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Appendix D: 
Survey Reminder Postcard 
 
 
